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This paper develops a new framework for examining the distributional consequences of trade liberalization
that is consistent with increasing inequality in every country, growth in residual wage inequality, rising
unemployment, and reallocation within and between industries. While the opening of trade yields welfare
gains, unemployment and inequality within sectors are higher in the trade equilibrium than in the closed
economy. In the open economy changes in trade openness have nonmonotonic effects on unemployment
and inequality within sectors. As aggregate unemployment and inequality have within- and between-sector
components, changes in sector composition following the opening of trade complicate its impact on
aggregate unemployment and inequality. However, when countries are nearly symmetric, the sectoral
composition effects reinforce the within-sector effects, and both aggregate inequality and aggregate
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The existence of welfare gains from trade is one of the most central propositions of neoclassical
economics. Equally central is the idea that while countries as a whole can gain from trade, particular
individuals and groups within those countries can lose. Traditionally the key intellectual framework
for examining the distributional consequences of trade has been the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem
of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, according to which the interaction of country factor abundance and
industry factor intensity determines the impact of trade on the distribution of income. Several
limitations have, however, recently emerged concerning the use of this model as a framework for
understanding the distributional consequences of trade liberalization.1
While the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem predicts that trade liberalization leads to a rise in in-
come inequality in skill-abundant developed countries and a decline in income inequality in labor-
abundant developing countries, recent empirical evidence suggests rising income inequality in both
sets of countries following trade liberalization.2 Additionally, whereas neoclassical trade theory
emphasizes the return to skills as the prime driver of income inequality, a substantial component
of the recent rise in income inequality is accounted for by residual wage inequality that is unex-
plained by observed personal characteristics.3 Similarly, although unemployment is in practice an
important channel through which individuals can experience income loss from trade liberalization,
the frictionless factor markets in neoclassical trade theory rule out equilibrium unemployment by
assumption. Finally, while the mechanism through which trade aﬀects income inequality in the
Heckscher-Ohlin model is a reallocation of resources across industries that changes relative fac-
tor prices, recent empirical evidence from trade liberalization episodes suggests that much of the
observed reallocation instead occurs across ﬁrms within industries.4
In this paper we develop an alternative intellectual framework for examining the distributional
consequences of trade liberalization. Motivated by empirical evidence from micro datasets on ﬁrms
and workers, our model incorporates three key features of product and labor markets that together
enable us to make progress in addressing each of the limitations discussed above. First, hetero-
geneity in productivity across ﬁrms generates diﬀerences in ﬁrm revenue and proﬁts, and as a
result trade liberalization induces reallocations of resources across ﬁrms within industries as well as
across industries. Second, heterogeneity in unobserved ability across workers, imperfect screening
of worker ability by ﬁrms, and wage bargaining give rise to rent sharing within ﬁrms and wage
variation across ﬁrms. Third, as a result of search and matching frictions in the labor market, equi-
1The main competing framework within neoclassical trade theory is the speciﬁc factors model. Several of the
limitations discussed below also apply to that model, including in particular the absence of unemployment and the
emphasis on across-sector reallocation of resources.
2See for example the survey by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007). For a neoclassical model in which trade can increase
the return to skills in both developed and developing countries, see Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and Zhu and Treﬂer
(2005).
3For developed-country evidence, see Autor et al. (2008), Juhn et al. (1993), and Lemieux (2006). For evidence
of a rise in residual inequality following trade liberalization, see Attanasio et al. (2004) and Menezes-Filho et al.
(2008).
4See for example Attanasio et al. (2004) and Levinsohn (1999).
1librium unemployment occurs and workers with the same observed characteristics receive diﬀerent
wages. The combination of these three features therefore generates residual wage inequality and
unemployment that can increase in all countries following trade liberalization. Moreover, each of
the features interact with one another to shape equilibrium labor and product market outcomes.
Our model builds upon the closed-economy framework of Helpman et al. (2008). We consider
a world of two countries which can be asymmetric along a number of dimensions, although we
emphasize asymmetry in labor market frictions. Labor is the sole factor of production and there
are two sectors: a homogeneous-good sector that is chosen for the numeraire and a diﬀerentiated-
good sector consisting of many horizontally-diﬀerentiated varieties. The homogeneous good is
produced with a unit labor requirement under conditions of perfect competition, and therefore
workers in this sector receive for certain a wage of one. In contrast, varieties of the diﬀerentiated
product are produced under conditions of monopolistic competition and in the presence of labor
market frictions, which give rise to equilibrium unemployment. As labor is mobile across sectors,
the expected return to entering the diﬀerentiated sector, which equals the average wage times the
probability of employment, has to equal the certain wage of one in the homogeneous-good sector if
both goods are produced.
Within the diﬀerentiated sector, ﬁrms are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity and
workers are heterogeneous in terms of an unobserved ability. Worker ability can be either match-
speciﬁco rw o r k e r - s p e c i ﬁc, and in either case it is drawn from a known distribution but not costlessly
observed when a worker is matched with a ﬁrm. Each ﬁrm in a diﬀerentiated sector incurs a search
cost t om a t c hw i t hw o r k e r sa n dascreening cost to obtain information about their ability. By
incurring the screening cost, the ﬁrm can determine those workers who have an ability below an
endogenously-chosen threshold. Firm output depends on ﬁrm productivity, the measure of workers
hired, and the average ability of the workers hired. Each ﬁrm therefore chooses a screening ability
threshold trading oﬀ the increase in output from raising average worker ability against the reduction
in output from hiring fewer workers and the costs incurred by screening. In equilibrium, more
productive ﬁrms have larger revenues, sample more workers, screen to a higher ability threshold
and employ workers with a higher average ability. The ﬁrm and its workers engage in strategic
bargaining over the division of the surplus from production. As more productive ﬁrms employ
workforces with higher average ability, which are more costly to replace, they pay higher equilibrium
wages.
We consider a trade equilibrium with ﬁxed and variable costs of trade in which only some ﬁrms
export. As in Melitz (2003), the least productive ﬁrms cannot cover the ﬁxed cost of production
and exit, more productive ﬁrms serve the domestic market only, and the most productive ﬁrms
pay the ﬁxed exporting cost and serve both the domestic and foreign markets. The combination
of a ﬁxed cost of exporting and rent-sharing within ﬁrms results in a discrete jump in both ﬁrm
revenue and wages at the productivity threshold for entry into the export market. The model
therefore matches empirical ﬁndings that exporters pay higher wages than nonexporters within the
same industry, even after controlling for ﬁrm size (see for example Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1997),
2and empirical ﬁndings that a substantial part of these higher wages is explained by diﬀerences in
workforce composition (see for example Kaplan and Verhoogen 2006, Schank, Schnabel and Wagner
2007, and Munch and Skaksen 2008).
One of our central results is that while the opening of trade is welfare improving, the distribution
of wages in the diﬀerentiated sector is more unequal in the trade equilibrium than in autarky. This
result holds for both countries. The intuition is as follows. As a high-productivity ﬁrm enters
the export market, the resulting increase in its revenues leads the ﬁrm to screen workers more,
so as to increase the average quality of its workforce. As a result, it becomes more costly for
the ﬁrm to replace the workers, and wage bargaining leads the ﬁrm to share the larger revenue
with its workers in the form of higher wages. Additionally, the positive probability of drawing a
productivity high enough to export increases the expected value of entry, which leads more ﬁrms
to enter the diﬀerentiated sector. This increased entry enhances product market competition and
reduces revenue and wages at low productivity ﬁr m st h a ts e r v eo n l yt h ed o m e s t i cm a r k e t . T h e
increased wages of exporters and reduced wages of non-exporters following the opening of trade
raise wage inequality within the diﬀerentiated sector relative to the autarky equilibrium. Once an
economy is open to international trade, however, the relationship between sectoral wage inequality
and trade openness is nonmonotonic. On the one hand, when nearly all ﬁrms serve only the
domestic market, an increase in trade openness enhances wage inequality by expanding the small
number of exporting ﬁrms that pay high wages. On the other hand, when nearly all ﬁrms export,
an increase in trade openness depresses wage inequality by further reducing the small number of
ﬁrms that serve only the domestic market and pay low wages. Therefore, once the economy is open
to international trade, a given change in trade openness can have quite diﬀerent eﬀects on sectoral
wage inequality depending on the initial fraction of ﬁrms that export.
Another key result is that unemployment in the diﬀerentiated sector is higher in the trade
equilibrium than in autarky. Unemployment arises in this sector as a result of the search and
screening frictions. Workers can be unemployed either because they are not matched with ﬁrms, or
because once matched they are not hired as a result of their ability falling below the ﬁrm’s screening
ability cutoﬀ. The opening of trade leads to change in industry composition, as low-productivity
ﬁrms that serve only the domestic market exit and contract, while high-productivity ﬁrms that
export expand. Since more productive ﬁrms screen to a higher ability cutoﬀ,t h e yh i r eas m a l l e r
fraction of sampled workers than less productive ﬁrms. Therefore, this change in composition
towards more productive ﬁrms within the diﬀerentiated sector increases unemployment. Once
the economy is open to international trade, however, trade openness can have a nonmonotonic
relationship with unemployment as with wage inequality. The reason is that as the fraction of
exporting ﬁrms increases, new entrants to the export market become less and less productive
relative to existing exporters, until eventually all ﬁrms export. As less productive ﬁrms have less
selective recruitment policies, this change in composition towards less productive ﬁrms within the
group of exporters can potentially reduce unemployment.
Income inequality in our model depends on both wage inequality and unemployment. We use
3the Theil index as our preferred measure of inequality, because it permits an exact decomposition
of overall inequality into the contributions of within- and between-group inequality measures. We
are therefore able to undertake this decomposition for the diﬀerentiated sector using the two groups
of employed and unemployed workers. As the opening of the closed economy to trade raises both
wage inequality and unemployment in the diﬀerentiated sector, it also increases income inequality
in the diﬀerentiated sector. Similarly, once the economy is open to trade, the fact that changes in
trade openness have ambiguous eﬀects on wage inequality and unemployment implies that they also
have ambiguous eﬀects on income inequality. Therefore, once the economy is open to trade, a given
change in trade openness can either increase or decrease income inequality within the diﬀerentiated
sector.
Having examined how trade openness aﬀects inequality and unemployment in the diﬀerentiated
sector, we next turn to the impact of labor market frictions. Despite the model’s richness, we show
that its comparative statics can be characterized in the neighborhood of an equilibrium with small
asymmetries between the two countries in which only a small fraction of ﬁrms export. In the envi-
rons of such an equilibrium, an increase in a country’s labor market frictions leads to a contraction
in the diﬀerentiated sector at home relative to the foreign country, which reduces the degree of prod-
uct market competition in the home market relative to the foreign market. This change in relative
product market competition makes serving the foreign market less attractive relative to serving the
home market and reduces the fraction of home ﬁrms that export. In turn, the reduction in export
participation of domestic ﬁrms decreases wage inequality within the diﬀerentiated sector at home.
In contrast, if there are large asymmetries in labor market frictions between the two countries and
a nonnegligible fraction of ﬁrms exports, there can be a nonmonotonic relationship between labor
market frictions and sectoral wage inequality, which reﬂects the nonmonotonic relationship between
trade openness and sectoral wage inequality discussed above.
Our general equilibrium focus also enables us to highlight the distinction between sectoral
unemployment and inequality, as discussed above, and the aggregate values of these variables for
the economy as a whole. The key diﬀerence between these two levels of analysis is that changes in
sectoral composition need to be taken into account at the aggregate level.5 We again use the Theil
index to decompose aggregate inequality into its within- and between-group components, where the
groups are now the homogeneous and diﬀerentiated sectors. When countries are symmetric, the
increase in average productivity in the diﬀerentiated sector, induced by the opening of trade between
formerly closed economies, expands the share of the labor force employed in this sector in both
countries. Therefore aggregate unemployment and income inequality rise in both countries, because
of greater unemployment and income inequality in the diﬀerentiated sector, and also because of
a larger share of the labor force employed in this sector, which has higher unemployment and
income inequality than the homogeneous sector. When countries are asymmetric, the country with
a comparative advantage in the diﬀerentiated sector experiences an increase in the share of its labor
5Recent empirical evidence that such compositional eﬀects are important includes Lemieux (2006) for residual
inequality and Blum (2008) for overall inequality.
4force employed in this sector following the opening of trade, and hence exhibits a rise in aggregate
unemployment and income inequality. In contrast, the country with a comparative disadvantage
in the diﬀerentiated sector experiences a decrease in the share of its labor force employed in this
sector following the opening of trade, yielding an ambiguous impact on aggregate unemployment
and income inequality.
Our paper is related to recent research on ﬁrm heterogeneity in international trade, which
builds on the inﬂuential framework developed by Melitz (2003), such as Antràs and Helpman
(2004), Bernard et al. (2007), and Helpman et al. (2004).6 In this literature, the modelling of the
labor market has traditionally been highly stylized; workers are identical and reallocation across
ﬁrms is costless. As a result, these authors predict that ﬁrms pay workers with the same observed
characteristics the same wage, irrespective of the ﬁrm’s productivity, which sits awkwardly with a
large empirical literature that ﬁnds a positive employer—size wage premium and rent—sharing within
ﬁrms.7 In contrast, in our framework rent sharing leads to diﬀerences in wages across ﬁrms for
workers with the same observed characteristics, which is consistent with the observed employer-size
wage premium. Moreover, consistent with recent evidence from matched employee-employer data
sets, the employer—size wage premium is driven by the endogenous sorting of workers across ﬁrms
according to unobserved worker characteristics.8
Our research is also related to the literature on international trade and labor market frictions.
One strand of this literature considers the implications for trade of theories of eﬃciency or fair
wages, including Amiti and Davis (2008), Davis and Harrigan (2007), Egger and Kreickemeier
(2007, 2008) and Grossman and Helpman (2008). Another strand of research, more closely related
to our work, examines the consequences for trade of Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and
matching frictions, including Davidson et al. (1988, 1999), Felbermayr et al. (2008) and Helpman
and Itskhoki (2008). Our main point of departure from most existing research on international trade
and labor market frictions is the introduction of worker heterogeneity and imperfect screening
of workers by ﬁrms, which generates residual wage inequality that is inﬂuenced by both trade
liberalization and labor market frictions.
Our paper is also related to the large labor and macroeconomics literature concerned with search
frictions in the labor market.9 A number of approaches have been taken in the search literature to
explaining wage diﬀerences across workers. One inﬂuential line of research has followed Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) and Mortensen (2003) in analyzing wage dispersion in models of wage posting
and random search. Another important line of research has examined wage dispersion when both
ﬁrms and workers are heterogeneous, including models of pure random search such as Shimer and
6For an alternative approach to modelling ﬁrm heterogeneity and trade, see Bernard et al. (2003).
7While wages vary across heterogeneous ﬁrms in Yeaple (2005), this variation arises because ﬁrms employ workers
with heterogeneous observed characteristics.
8For example, using French matched employee-employer data, Abowd et al. (1999) ﬁnd that around 90 percent
of the employer—size wage premium is accounted for by the sorting of workers across ﬁrms according to unobserved
worker characteristics. See the Abowd and Kramatz (1999) survey for a discussion of similar ﬁndings from other
countries.
9See in particular Mortensen (1970), Pissarides (1974), Diamond (1982a,b), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and
Pissarides (2000), as reviewed in Rogerson et al. (2005).
5Smith (2000), Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Davidson et al. (2008), and models incorporating on-
the-job-search such as Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), Cahuc et al. (2006) and Lentz (2008).10 In
both lines of research, worker ability is assumed to be costlessly observable by ﬁrms when matching
occurs. In contrast, our framework emphasizes the idea that a substantial component of worker
ability cannot be directly observed, so that ﬁrms undertake costly investments in order to gain only
imperfect information about worker ability.11 Given a common screening technology for all ﬁrms,
more productive ﬁrms have an incentive to screen more intensively, because they have a greater
return to hiring higher ability workers. In equilibrium, more productive ﬁrms have workforces of
higher average ability, which increases the cost of replacing those workers in the bargaining game,
and leads more productive ﬁrms to pay higher wages.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and solves
for general equilibrium. Section 3 presents our core results on the impact of international trade
on welfare, wage inequality, unemployment, and income inequality. Section 4 examines the im-
pact of trade impediments and labor market frictions on inequality and unemployment. Section 5
concludes, while the Appendix contains detailed derivations of the main results.
2 The Model
This section lays out the model and characterizes its equilibrium. We consider a world economy
consisting of a home country and a foreign country. As our analysis focuses on asymmetries in
labor market frictions, we assume that the home and foreign countries are identical in other re-
spects. Nonetheless, our framework can also be used to consider other asymmetries, such as in the
distributions of ﬁrm productivity and worker ability or in country size, as discussed further below.
Although we allow for ﬁrm and worker heterogeneity, search and matching, and wage bargaining,
the general equilibrium of the two-country world remains tractable as a result of a number of
simplifying assumptions that we make about preferences, production technology, and distribution
functions. In particular, we adopt the speciﬁcations from the closed economy model of Helpman et
al. (2008), where the reader can ﬁnd a more detailed discussion of the properties of demand, the
production technology, and labor market frictions.
Throughout the following we denote home variables without an asterisk and foreign variables
with an asterisk. To simplify notation, we develop equilibrium relationships for the home country,
with analogous expressions holding for foreign.
10As o m e w h a td i ﬀerent line of research in Ohnsorge and Treﬂer (2007) has examined two-dimensional worker
heterogeneity within the context of the Roy model.
11See Jovanovic (1979), (1984) and Moscarini (2005) for mode l si nw h i c haw o r k e r ’ sp r o d u c t i v i t yi naj o bi sr e v e a l e d
gradually over time with job tenure.
62.1 Preferences and Demand
Utility depends on consumption of a homogeneous and a diﬀerentiated product.12 We assume
that preferences between the two products are quasi-linear, while preferences across varieties of
the diﬀerentiated product take a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form. In particular, the
utility function is









,ζ < β < 1, (1)
where q0 is consumption of the homogeneous good, Q denotes the real consumption index of va-
rieties of the diﬀerentiated product, q(ω) represents consumption of variety ω, Ω denotes the set
of varieties available for consumption, ζ controls the elasticity of substitution between the homo-
geneous and diﬀerentiated products, and β controls the elasticity of substitution between varieties
of the diﬀerentiated product. The parameter restriction β>ζensures that brands of the diﬀeren-
tiated product are better substitutes for each other than for the homogeneous good. We assume
that the homogeneous good is costlessly traded between countries and choose it as our numeraire,
so that p0 = p∗
0 =1 .13
Given these preferences, the equilibrium revenue received by a ﬁrm in the diﬀerentiated sector
can be written as follows:
r(ω)=Q−(β−ζ)q(ω)β. (2)
Tighter product market competition–reﬂected in a low sectoral price index P–leads to higher
aggregate sectoral demand, Q, but to lower demand for each individual variety in the sector, and
lower revenue, r(ω).These preferences also imply that the indirect utility function can be expressed
in terms of aggregate income and consumer surplus from the diﬀerentiated good:
V = E +
1−ζ






where E is income (expenditure), and consumer surplus from the diﬀerentiated product can be ex-





While individual workers face idiosyncratic risk, we assume for analytical convenience that each
country is populated by a continuum of identical families of measure one, each of which has the
preferences of the representative consumer. As each family includes a measure of ¯ L workers that
maximize the family’s utility, idiosyncratic risk is perfectly diversiﬁed within families.15
12While for clarity we focus on the case of a single diﬀerentiated sector, the introduction of multiple diﬀerentiated
sectors is straightforward.
13See Helpman and Itskhoki (2008) for a discussion of trade costs in the homogeneous sector.





, where p(ω) is the price of variety ω.
15Alternatively, if we assumed homothetic preferences over the consumption of the homogeneous and diﬀerentiated
goods and constant relative risk aversion, the family interpretation would be useful, but not required. In this case
the idiosyncratic risk across agents does not have to be fully diversiﬁed in equilibrium. See Helpman and Itskhoki
72.2 Technologies and Market Structure
The homogeneous good is produced using a constant returns to scale technology, with one unit of
labor required for each unit of output, and there are no labor market frictions in this sector. We
choose the factor endowments ¯ L = ¯ L∗ to be large enough so that in equilibrium both countries
consume and produce the homogeneous good. Therefore, with the homogeneous good chosen as
the numeraire, the wage in the homogeneous sector is equal to one in each country: w0 = w∗
0 =1 .
In the diﬀerentiated sector, both ﬁrm and worker productivity levels are heterogeneous. A
worker’s productivity in a diﬀerentiated-sector ﬁr mi sa s s u m e dt od e p e n do nh e ra b i l i t ya,w h i c h
can be speciﬁc to the match between the ﬁrm and worker, or speciﬁc to the worker. In either case,
this ability is unknown when the worker decides whether to seek employment in the homogeneous
or diﬀerentiated sectors. Worker ability is assumed to be drawn from a Pareto distribution, with
cumulative distribution function Ga (a)=1 − (amin/a)
k for a ≥ amin > 0 and k>2.T h i s
distribution is not only tractable, but together with our other assumptions yields a Pareto income
distribution, which provides a reasonable approximation to observed income distributions (see for
example Pen, 1971).
There is a competitive fringe of potential ﬁrms who can choose to enter the diﬀerentiated sector
by paying an entry cost of fe units of the homogeneous good. Once a ﬁrm incurs the sunk entry
cost, it observes its productivity, θ, also drawn from a Pareto distribution, with the cumulative
distribution function Gθ (θ)=1− (θmin/θ)
z for θ ≥ θmin > 0 and z>2. Together with our
other assumptions, this speciﬁcation yields a Pareto ﬁrm-size distribution, which also provides a
reasonable approximation to observed ﬁrm-size distributions (see for example Axtell, 2001). As in
equilibrium all ﬁrms with the same productivity in the diﬀerentiated sector behave similarly, we
index ﬁrms by θ from now onwards.
Firms in the diﬀerentiated sector produce horizontally diﬀerentiated varieties under conditions
of monopolistic competition. Production of each variety involves a ﬁxed production cost of fd units
of the homogeneous good. The amount of output of the variety produced, y, depends upon the
productivity of the ﬁrm, θ, the average ability of its workers, ¯ a, and the measure of workers hired, h.
We assume that there are diminishing marginal returns to the measure of workers hired and that
the production technology takes the following form:
y = θhγ¯ a, 0 <γ<1.
This production function can be interpreted as capturing either human capital externalities (e.g., pro-
duction in teams in which the productivity of a worker depends on the average productivity of her
team) or a managerial time constraint (e.g., a manager with a ﬁxed amount of time who needs
to allocate some time to each worker). Helpman et al. (2008) provide further discussion of these
interpretations.
In addition to the ﬁxed cost of production, a diﬀerentiated-sector ﬁrm incurs a ﬁxed exporting
(2008) for more details.
8cost of fx units of the homogeneous good in order to serve the foreign market. An exporting ﬁrm
in the diﬀerentiated sector also incurs variable trade costs, which take the iceberg form, such that
τ>1 units of a variety must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive in the other country.
Firms in the diﬀerentiated sector face labor market frictions. A ﬁrm that pays a search cost of
bn units of the homogeneous good can randomly sample a measure of n workers, where the search
cost b is endogenously determined by labor market frictions as discussed below. The ﬁrm can also
screen the sampled workers and identify those with an ability below ac (with ac ≥ amin)b yp a y i n g
a screening cost of caδ
c/δ units of the homogeneous good, where c>0 and δ>0.16 Screening costs
are increasing in the ability cutoﬀ ac chosen by the ﬁrm, because more complex and costlier tests
are required for higher ability cutoﬀs.17
As search is random, the ability distribution among workers sampled by a ﬁrm is described by
the ex ante distribution function Ga (a). With a Pareto distribution of worker ability, the measure
of workers hired with abilities greater than a screening ability cutoﬀ ac is h = n(amin/ac)
k,a n d









We focus on parameter values that satisfy 0 <γ<1/k, which implies that there are suﬃciently
strong diminishing returns to the measure of workers hired (low γ)r e l a t i v et ot h ed i s p e r s i o no f
worker ability (high 1/k) such that ﬁrm output can be increased by not hiring the lowest-ability
workers sampled by the ﬁrm. While hiring the lowest ability workers would increase ﬁrm output
by raising employment, it would decrease ﬁrm output by reducing average worker ability. For
0 <γ<1/k, the second eﬀect dominates, so that the marginal product of workers with an ability
below ac (θ) is negative.18 As a result some low ability workers are not hired, which is consistent
with the view that ﬁrms screen job candidates in order to exclude those believed to be less able.
We assume that preferences, the production technology, and the distribution of productivity
and worker ability are the same in both countries. However, the two countries can diﬀer in the
extent of labor market frictions: search cost, b, and screening cost, c.19
16In this formulation, there is a ﬁxed cost of screening, even when the screening is not informative, i.e., when
ac = amin. We focus on interior equilibria in which ﬁrms of all productivities choose screening tests that are
informative, ac >a min,a n ds ot h eﬁxed cost of screening is always incurred. As we show below, this is the case when
the screening cost, c,i ss u ﬃciently small.
17There are therefore increasing returns to scale in screening. All results generalize immediately to the case where
the screening costs are separable in ac and n and linear in n.
18In contrast, when γ>1/k,n oﬁrm screens and the model reduces to a model without screening, as studied in
Helpman and Itskhoki (2008). For this reason, we do not discuss this case here.
19We also could allow for the size of the countries to be diﬀerent, i.e., ¯ L could diﬀer from ¯ L
∗,b u tt h i sd i ﬀerence is
not important as long as we focus on equilibria in which each country consumes and produces the homogeneous and
diﬀerentiated products, which are the equilibria we shall analyze.
92.3 Wages, Employment and Proﬁts
A θ-ﬁrm allocates its output y(θ) between domestic and foreign sales, yd (θ) and yx (θ) respectively,
to maximize its proﬁts. With consumer love of variety and a ﬁxed production cost, no ﬁrm will ever
serve the export market without also serving the domestic market. Hence ﬁrms either serve only the
domestic market or both markets. When both markets are served, proﬁt maximization implies that
the ﬁrm equates marginal revenues in the two markets, which from (2) implies [yd (θ)/yx (θ)]
β−1 =
τ−β (Q/Q∗)
−(β−ζ).20 Therefore a ﬁrm’s total revenue can be expressed as follows:
r(θ) ≡ rd (θ)+rx (θ)=Υ(θ)
1−β Q−(β−ζ)y(θ)
β , (5)
where rd (θ) is revenue from domestic sales, rx (θ) is revenue from exporting, y(θ)=yd (θ)+yx (θ)
is total ﬁrm output, and











where Ix (θ) is an indicator variable that equals one if the ﬁrm exports and zero otherwise. We
refer to Υ(θ) as a “market access” variable, which depends on whether the ﬁrm chooses to serve
both the domestic and foreign markets or only the domestic market.
The presence of labor market frictions in the diﬀerentiated sector implies that workers inside
the ﬁrm are not interchangeable with workers outside the ﬁrm. As a result, hired workers have
bargaining power. We assume that the ﬁrm and its hired h workers engage in strategic bargaining
with equal weights in the manner proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b). At the bargaining
stage, the search and screening costs have been sunk by the ﬁrm, and the outside option of hired
workers is unemployment, whose value we normalize to zero. Furthermore, the only information
revealed by screening about worker ability is that each of the hired workers has an ability above the
cutoﬀ ac, so that neither the ﬁrm nor workers know individual abilities.21 Therefore, the outcome
of this bargaining game is that fraction 1/(1 + βγ) of the revenue (5) is retained by the ﬁrm while
each worker gets fraction βγ/(1 + βγ) of the average revenue per worker.22
A ﬁrm chooses its total output to maximize its proﬁts subject to the revenue function (5) and
the production technology (4). This proﬁt-maximization problem can be written as choosing the




where qx(θ) is the ‘free on board’ quantity produced for the export market prior to transport cost being incurred.
21While we study a static model, in which workers do not know their ability before they decide which sector to
enter and ﬁrms do not know the ability of individual workers, the same issues could also be examined in a dynamic
speciﬁcation in which workers and ﬁrms can update their priors on unobserved ability over time. As long as there
remains imperfect information about unobserved worker ability, as for example in a setting with continuing birth and
death of workers and ﬁrms, we expect the residual inequality emphasized by our model to also be a feature of the
dynamic economy.
22See the Appendix for further details.




































c + fd + Ixfx
´)
.
From the ﬁrst-order conditions to this problem, the equilibrium measure of workers sampled and







Therefore ﬁrms with larger revenue sample more workers and screen to a higher ability. The
measure of workers hired, h = n(amin/ac)
k, is increasing in the measure of workers sampled, n, but
decreasing in the screening ability cutoﬀ, ac. Under the assumption δ>k , ﬁrms with larger revenue
also hire more workers, in line with empirical evidence. Finally, from the division of revenue in the
bargaining game, the total wage bill is a constant share of revenue, which implies that wages are















Intuitively, as a result of screening to a higher ability cutoﬀ,aﬁrm with larger revenue has a
workforce of higher average ability. Since it is more costly to replace a workforce of higher average
ability, this improves workers’ bargaining position and leads ﬁrms with larger revenue to pay higher
wages. From the discussion above, the assumption δ>kimplies that ﬁrms with larger revenue
hire more workers as well as pay higher wages, ensuring that the model is consistent with empirical
ﬁndings of a positive employer-size wage eﬀect (see for example the survey by Oi and Idson, 1999).
Using the ﬁrst-order conditions (8) and (9), equilibrium total ﬁrm revenue can be written as
the following increasing function of ﬁrm productivity:








Γ ≡ 1 − βγ −
β
δ
(1 − γk) > 0, (12)
where κr is a constant that depends on the parameters β,γ,δ,k and amin (see Appendix). The
derived parameter Γ inﬂuences the equilibrium relationship between relative ﬁrm revenue and
relative ﬁrm productivity, and depends upon the dispersion of worker ability (as captured by k),
11the screening technology (through δ), the curvature of demand (as parameterized by β), and the
extent of diminishing returns to the measure of workers hired (as captured by γ).
The ﬁrst-order conditions (8) and (9) also imply that the measure of workers sampled, n,t h e
screening ability cutoﬀ, ac, the measure of workers hired, h, total output, y,a n dw a g e s ,w,c a n
all be written as increasing functions of ﬁrm revenue. Therefore, as ﬁrm revenue is increasing
in productivity, more productive ﬁrms sample more workers, screen more intensively, hire more
workers, produce more output and pay higher wages. Finally, total ﬁrm proﬁts can be expressed




r(θ) − fd − Ix (θ)fx. (13)
As a ﬁrm either serves only the domestic market, or if it exports equates its marginal revenue
between the domestic and export markets, revenue in each market can be expressed as the following








The presence of a ﬁxed production cost implies that there is a zero-proﬁtc u t o ﬀ for productivity, θd,
such that a ﬁrm drawing a productivity below θd exits without producing. Similarly, the presence
of a ﬁxed exporting cost implies that there is an exporting cutoﬀ for productivity, θx, such that
a ﬁrm drawing a productivity below θx does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to serve the export market. As
a large empirical literature ﬁnds evidence of selection into export markets, where only the most
productive ﬁr m se x p o r t ,w ef o c u so nv a l u e so fv a r i a b l et r a d ec o s t sa n dt h eﬁxed production and
ﬁxed exporting costs for which θx >θ d >θ min, as discussed further below.23 Therefore the least
productive ﬁrms exit, more productive ﬁrms serve only the domestic market, and only the most
productive ﬁrms export.
2.4 Open Economy Equilibrium
We reference the open economy equilibrium by six variables in each country: (i) the zero-proﬁt
productivity cutoﬀ,b e l o ww h i c hﬁrms exit, θd; (ii) the exporting cutoﬀ productivity, above which
ﬁrms export, θx; (iii) the domestic real consumption index for the diﬀerentiated product, Q;( i v )
the measure of ﬁrms operating in the diﬀerentiated sector, M; (v) the measure of workers seeking
employment in this sector, L; and (vi) the tightness of the labor market in this sector, x ≡ N/L,
where N is the measure of workers sampled by diﬀerentiated-sector ﬁrms, and where the role of x is
explained further below. All other endogenous variables, including employment in the homogeneous
sector, L0 = ¯ L−L, and consumption of the homogeneous good, q0, can be determined as functions
of these six variables. We characterize the equilibrium conditions that determine these variables
for the home country. Analogous equilibrium conditions hold in the foreign country.
23For empirical evidence of selection into export markets, see for example Bernard and Jensen (1995) and Roberts
and Tybout (1997).
122.4.1 Product Markets
In an equilibrium in which only some ﬁrms export, ﬁrms with a productivity just below the export-





=1 .I nc o n t r a s t ,ﬁrms with a productivity


















Therefore the revenue function, r(θ), is discontinuous at the export cutoﬀ and jumps by the factor
of proportionality Υ
(1−β)/Γ
x > 1 as productivity rises from θ−
x to θ+
x (see (11)).
The zero-proﬁtc u t o ﬀ productivity, θd,b e l o ww h i c hﬁrms exit, is deﬁned by the requirement
that variable proﬁts in the domestic market equal the ﬁxed production cost; that is, πd(θd)=0 .













where we substituted Υ(θd)=Υd =1into the revenue function.
Similarly, the exporting cutoﬀ productivity, θx,a b o v ew h i c hﬁrms export, is determined by
the requirement that at this productivity a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between serving only the domestic




































This equation states that the incremental proﬁt from serving the foreign market for a ﬁrm with
productivity θx, given by the expression on the left-hand side, is equal to the ﬁxed cost of entering
the foreign market.
In equilibrium, we also require the free-entry condition to hold, which equates the expected







where the subscript d + x indicates the sum of proﬁts from domestic sales and exports. There-
fore the expected value of entry depends on proﬁts from serving only the domestic market for
θ ∈ [θd,θx) and proﬁts from serving both markets for θ ∈ [θx,∞). From (11) the relative revenue
for any two ﬁrms serving only the domestic market depends solely on their relative productivity,
rd (θ)=( θ/θd)
β/Γ rd (θd), while the zero-proﬁtc u t o ﬀ condition (16) implies rd (θd)=fd (1 + βγ)/Γ.
Similarly, from (11) the relative revenue of any two exporters depends solely on their relative
13productivity, rd+x (θ)=( θ/θx)
β/Γ rd+x (θx), while the exporting cutoﬀ condition (17) implies
rd+x (θx)=rd (θx)+fx (1 + βγ)/Γ. Using these relationships together with equilibrium proﬁts





















Now note that, given Q∗, and after substituting (15) into (17), conditions (16)-(18) characterize
the equilibrium values of the home country’s domestic and export cutoﬀs and real consumption of
diﬀerentiated products, i.e., the vector (θd,θx,Q). Similar equations characterize the equilibrium
values of the foreign country’s variables (θ∗
d,θ∗
x,Q ∗),g i v e nQ. Together, they allow us to solve for
(θd,θx,Q,θ∗
d,θ∗
x,Q ∗). The equilibrium values of these six variables are independent of the other
equilibrium conditions that we describe below. For this reason the model is bloc recursive; after
solving these six variables one can proceed to solve the rest of the model.24,25
Having solved this ﬁrst bloc of equilibrium conditions, we can determine the mass of ﬁrms in
the diﬀerentiated sector in each country, M and M∗,u s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of the real consumption
index in (1) and the requirement that consumption in each market equals output supplied to that
market. In the home country this means that expenditure on diﬀerentiated products, PQ= Qζ,h a s
to equal the revenue of domestic and foreign ﬁrms that sell varieties of the diﬀerentiated product









x (θ)dGθ (θ). (19)
Using the revenue functions in (14) and the cutoﬀ conditions (16) and (17), we obtain an expression
which, together with its counterpart for the foreign country, constitutes the second bloc of the
equilibrium system that allows us to solve for the mass of ﬁr m si ne a c hc o u n t r y ,(M,M∗) (see
Appendix for more details).
2.4.2 Labor Markets
Following the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model of search and unemployment, we
assume that the search cost, b, depends on the tightness of the labor market, x:
b = α0xα1,α 0 > 1,α 1 > 0,
24Note that this bloc of equilibrium conditions depends on the values of exogenous parameters, including screening
costs (c and c
∗) and variable and ﬁxed trade costs (τ and fx), as well as on the values of the endogenous search costs
(b and b
∗). We show below, however, that the value of the search cost is pinned down by exogenous labor market
parameters and hence can also be taken as exogenous for this bloc of the model.
25The Appendix provides closed-form expressions for these and other endogenous variables for the case of symmetric
countries, and derives the parameter restrictions that ensure θx >θ d >θ min.S p e c i ﬁcally, we show that θx >θ d
requires that the ﬁxed cost of exporting, fx, is large relative to the ﬁxed cost of production, fd, while θd >θ min
requires that the ﬁxed cost of production is large relative to the ﬁxed cost of entry, fe.
14where labor market tightness depends on the measure of workers sampled by ﬁrms relative to the
total measure of workers searching for employment in the diﬀerentiated sector, x ≡ N/L.A s
shown by Blanchard and Gali (2008), this relationship can be derived from a constant-returns-
to-scale Cobb-Douglas matching function and a cost of posting vacancies.26 The parameter α0
is increasing in the cost of posting vacancies and decreasing in the productivity of the matching
technology, while α1 depends on the weight of vacancies in the Cobb-Douglas matching function.
In an incomplete specialization equilibrium, workers must be indiﬀerent between searching for
employment in the diﬀerentiated sector and receiving a certain wage of one in the homogeneous
sector.27 As the expected return to searching for employment in the diﬀerentiated sector equals the
probability of being sampled times the expected wage conditional on being sampled, the requirement
for workers to be indiﬀerent can be written as:
xb =1 ,
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dh(θ)=n(θ)[amin/ac (θ)]
k and w(θ)=b[ac(θ)/amin]
k. Thus the expected
wage conditional on being sampled by a θ-ﬁrm, w(θ)h(θ)/n(θ)=b, is constant across all ﬁrms, and
workers have no incentive to direct their search towards certain types of ﬁrms.
Combining this indiﬀerence condition with the matching technology above, we can solve for the
search cost, b, as a function of model parameters, and hence determine the equilibrium tightness




0 > 1 and x =1 /b= α
− 1
1+α1
0 < 1. (20)
Thus, as b depends solely on parameters of the model, we treat it in our discussion below as a derived
parameter that summarizes the degree of search frictions in the diﬀerentiated sector. Recall that b
is larger the less eﬃcient the matching technology and the higher the cost of posting vacancies.
The mass of workers searching for employment in the diﬀerentiated sector, L,c a nb ed e t e r m i n e d
from the requirement that the sector’s total wage bill equals L, which ensures that the ex ante











where the second equality uses the fact that the wage bill is a constant share of revenue. As
before, using the revenue functions in (14) and the cutoﬀ conditions (16) and (17), we obtain an
expression which, together with its counterpart for the foreign country, constitutes the third bloc
of the equilibrium system that allows us to solve for the mass of workers in each country, (L,L∗)
(see Appendix for more details).
This completes our description of the open economy equilibrium conditions; the solutions from
26See also Helpman and Itskhoki (2008) for a derivation of labor costs when there are hiring costs, ﬁring costs, and
unemployment beneﬁts.
27This equilibrium condition is similar to Harris and Todaro (1970).
15the previous two blocs of equations for (θd,θx,Q,θ∗
d,θ∗
x,Q ∗) and (M,M∗) together with (21) and a
similar equation for the foreign country provide solutions for the measure of workers searching for
jobs in the diﬀerentiated sector in each country, (L,L∗).
2.4.3 Variation Across Firms
Given the equilibrium values for the domestic and exporting cutoﬀ productivities, (θd,θx),a n d
consumption in the diﬀerentiated sector in the two countries, (Q,Q∗), we can solve for all ﬁrm-
speciﬁc variables for the home country. Speciﬁcally, they can be expressed as functions of the
domestic and exporting cutoﬀ productivities, θd and θx, and the market access variable, Υ(θ),
which depends on whether a ﬁrm chooses to serve the foreign market, as well as on the variable
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(22)
where Υ(θ) i sg i v e ni n( 6 ) .
Evidently, all these ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables are monotonically increasing in productivity and
they experience a discrete upward jump at the exporting cutoﬀ θx,a tw h i c hp o i n tΥ(θ) jumps
from 1 to Υx > 1. Therefore, as well as being more productive than nonexporters, exporters
have larger revenues, sample more workers, screen to a higher ability cutoﬀ,h i r em o r ew o r k e r s ,
and pay higher wages. Also note that these variables depend on the foreign country only through






1−β, which depends on relative real consumption indices in the two
countries, but does not directly depend on any other foreign variable. Similar ﬁrm-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s
can be derived for the foreign country.28
W h i l et h e r ea r ed i ﬀerences in productivity and size between exporters and nonexporters in
Melitz (2003) and Helpman and Itskhoki (2008), wages and workforce composition are the same
across all ﬁrms in their models. In contrast, our framework not only generates diﬀerences in produc-
tivity and size between exporters and nonexporters, but it also provides a theoretical explanation
28A sw ef o c u so na ni n t e r i o re q u i l i b r i u mi nw h i c ha l lﬁrms screen, we require ac (θd) >a min.F r o mt h es o l u t i o n s
for ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables (22), this condition holds if and only if
β(1 − γk)fd >c Γa
δ
min.
As γ<1/k was assumed above in order for any screening to occur, this condition is satisﬁed for a suﬃciently small
screening cost c.
16for the empirical ﬁnding that exporters pay higher wages (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1997).
Furthermore, the model is consistent with evidence from matched employee—employer datasets that
a substantial part of the higher wages paid by exporters arises from diﬀerences in workforce com-
position (see for example Kaplan and Verhoogen 2006, Schank, Schnabel and Wagner 2007, and
Munch and Skaksen 2008).29 Finally, note that in our model revenue-based productivity, r(θ)/h(θ),
exhibits the same pattern as wages, i.e., it increases with the size of the ﬁrm and is higher for ex-
porters than for nonexporters, consistent with empirical observations.
3 Trade Versus Autarky
In this section we derive the main results of the paper for the impact of trade on welfare, unem-
ployment, and inequality. We show that every country gains from trade, yet trade leads to higher
unemployment and more wage inequality in the diﬀerentiated sector than in autarky. The latter
result also implies that aggregate unemployment and aggregate wage and income inequality are
higher in the trade equilibrium than in autarky, as long as the two countries are suﬃciently similar
so that the compositional shift across sectors enhances the within-sectoral eﬀect. In Section 4, we
examine further how trade and labor market frictions inﬂuence unemployment and inequality in
each country.
3.1 Gains from Trade
Our economies are distorted, because ﬁrms price above marginal cost in the diﬀerentiated sector,
there are frictions in the labor market, and part of the labor force is unemployed, as discussed
further below. Nevertheless, both countries gain from trade.
To show gains from trade, consider ﬁrst the free-entry condition (18). This equation describes
a downward-sloping relationship between the domestic and exporting productivity cutoﬀs for every
distribution function Gθ (θ). The economics of this relationship is as follows. Consider an increase
in θx, which represents a reduction in export opportunities, in the sense that a higher productivity
is now required to proﬁtably export. As a result, expected proﬁts from exporting for a new entrant
are reduced. In order to induce ﬁrms to continue to enter, the reduction in expected proﬁts from
exporting has to be compensated for by an equal increase in the expected proﬁts from serving the
domestic market. This means that domestic sales need to be more proﬁtable for lower productivity
levels than they were before the decline in proﬁts from exporting. In other words, θd has to decline.
For the Pareto distribution function Gθ (θ)=1− (θmin/θ)















29On the one hand, more productive ﬁr m ss c r e e nt oah i g h e ra b i l i t yc u t o ﬀ, and so exporters do not hire some
l o w - a b i l i t yw o r k e r sw h ow o u l db eh i r e db yal e s sp r o d u c t i v eﬁrm serving only the domestic market (diﬀerences in
workforce composition). On the other hand, exporters pay higher wages to those workers who would also be hired
b yal e s sp r o d u c t i v eﬁrm serving only the domestic market (an exporter wage premium).
17Evidently, the domestic cutoﬀ is larger the smaller the export cutoﬀ is. In autarky there are no
exports and the domestic cutoﬀ is obtained as the limit of θx →∞ . It therefore follows that the
domestic cutoﬀ is larger in a trade equilibrium than in autarky.
Next, examine condition (16) for the domestic cutoﬀ; it holds in autarky and in every trade
equilibrium. Along this condition, the real consumption Q and the domestic cutoﬀ θd move together.
The intuition is the following: higher Q corresponds to a more competitive market in which only
more productive ﬁrms can make positive proﬁts and survive. Therefore, we conclude that in
equilibrium the real consumption index Q is higher the larger the domestic cutoﬀ θd is. As a result,
real consumption of diﬀerentiated products is higher in the trade equilibrium.
Finally, consider the indirect utility function (3). Family income E equals ¯ L,b e c a u s ew i t h
incomplete specialization the expected wage of a family member who seeks a job in the diﬀerentiated
sector is the same as the expected wage of a family member who seeks a job in the homogeneous
sector, which is equal to one in both autarky and the trade equilibrium. Therefore the indirect
utility of a family is
V = ¯ L +
1−ζ
ζ Qζ
in autarky and in a trade equilibrium, except that real consumption of the diﬀerentiated product is
higher in the trade equilibrium. It follows that welfare is higher in the trade equilibrium. A similar
analysis applies to the foreign country. This establishes
Proposition 1 Every country gains from trade.
Proof. The proposition follows immediately from the arguments above.
While every country gains from trade, we show in the following subsections that the distribution of
wages and the distribution of income (which accounts for both wage income and the zero income
of the unemployed) are more equal in autarky than in the trade equilibrium, and moreover, unem-
ployment is higher in the trade equilibrium. That is, while trade is beneﬁcial in welfare terms, it
negatively impacts wage and income inequality and unemployment, which are common indices of
social disparity.
3.2 Wage Inequality in the Diﬀerentiated Sector
While all workers have the same ex ante expected income of one, the equilibrium of the model
features ex post wage inequality across ﬁrms within sectors. Workers with the same observed char-
acteristics receive diﬀerent ex post wages depending on the employer with whom they are matched.
In this section we characterize the distribution of wages within the diﬀerentiated sector, while in
the following two sections we take account of unemployment and characterize the distribution of
income among all individuals seeking employment in a sector.
The sectoral distribution of wages can be derived from the solutions for ﬁrm-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s
in (22). Figure 1 displays the pattern of wages across ﬁrms for a particular set of parameter values
showing that–while more productive ﬁrms pay higher wages in general–exporters pay especially























Figure 1: Wages as a function of ﬁrm productivity
high wages; the least productive exporter pays discretely higher wages than a nonexporter with
slightly lower productivity.30 The empirical implication is that exporters should pay higher wages
than nonexporters within the same industry, even after controlling for ﬁrm characteristics such as
productivity and size, which is a robust ﬁnding in the large empirical literature on ﬁrm export
behavior following Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1997).
Combining the solution for ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables in (22) with the distribution of productivity
across ﬁrms, Gθ (θ)=1 − (θmin/θ)
z for θ ≥ θmin, we can compute the distribution of wages
across workers, which depends on both the wages and employment of ﬁrms with diﬀerent levels of
productivity. To characterize the wage distribution, we use ρ to denote the ratio of the domestic
to export cutoﬀ productivities: ρ ≡ θd/θx.I nt h i se v e n tt h ef r a c t i o no fe x p o r t i n gﬁrms equals ρz.
This trade openness variable obtains values between zero and one: ρ =0when the export cutoﬀ is
inﬁnite and no ﬁrm exports; ρ =1when the export cutoﬀ converges on the domestic cutoﬀ and all
ﬁrms export; in between, 0 <ρ<1 and only a fraction of ﬁrms export.
Using this notation for relative productivity cutoﬀs, the distribution of wages across workers
can be represented as a weighted average of the distribution of wages across domestic ﬁrms and





















30To derive closed form solutions for the model, we make a number of simplifying assumptions about functional
form. Therefore this and subsequent ﬁgures are intended merely to illustrate the qualitative features of the model
rather than its quantitative predictions. See the Appendix for a discussion of the parameter values used in all our
ﬁgures.
31See the Appendix for a formal derivation of all the results of this section.
19where wd = w(θd) is the wage rate paid by the least productive ﬁrm, given in (22); wd/ρβk/δΓ =
w(θ−
x ) is the wage rate paid by the most productive ﬁrm that serves only the domestic market;
wdΥ
k(1−β)/δΓ
x /ρβk/δΓ = w(θ+
x ) is the wage rate paid by the least productive exporting ﬁrm. The
share of workers employed by ﬁrms that serve only the domestic market, Sh,d, can be evaluated














The distribution of wages across workers conditional on being employed by a domestic ﬁrm,
Gw,d(w), can be derived in the following way. As from (22) the relative wages paid by any two
ﬁrms depend solely on their relative productivities, and productivity is Pareto distributed, Gw,d(w)









for wd≤ w ≤ wd/ρ
βk
δΓ. (24)
Similarly, the distribution of wages across workers conditional on being employed by an exporter,






















The shape parameter of the wage distribution, μ, depends not only on the dispersion of worker
ability k and the dispersion of ﬁrm productivity z, but also on the parameter δ of the screening cost,
the demand parameter β, and the technology parameter γ,e a c ho fw h i c he n t e r sΓ and inﬂuences
the allocation of workers across ﬁrms. For the wage distribution to have a ﬁnite variance, we require
μ<1, and we assume parameter values such that this inequality holds.32
>From the expressions above we note that the sectoral wage distribution depends on the en-
dogenous variables of the model only through our measure of openness to trade, ρ ≡ θd/θx,a n dt h e
market access variable, Υx ≡ 1+τ−β/(1−β) (Q∗/Q)
−(β−ζ)/(1−β).W h i l eρ determines the composi-
tion of ﬁrms in the sector between exporters and nonexporters, Υx determines the wage premium
paid by exporters over nonexporters. These variables both depend on trade costs and labor market
frictions in the two countries, as examined in Section 4. In addition to ρ and Υx, the sectoral
wage distribution depends on exogenous parameters of the model and, in particular, on the derived
32>From equation (26), μ<1 if and only if Γ ≡ 1 − βγ −
β
δ (1 − γk) > 2β/z. Therefore we assume suﬃciently
large values of δ and suﬃciently small values of β and γ for the inequality to hold, which implies that screening costs
are suﬃciently convex and revenue and output are suﬃciently concave.
20parameter μ. In this paper, we focus on how trade costs and labor market frictions aﬀect unem-
ployment and inequality through the endogenous variables ρ and Υx, keeping other parameters of
the model ﬁxed. In Helpman et al. (2008) we study the eﬀects of the productivity and ability
dispersion parameters (z and k) on unemployment and inequality in a closed economy.
As shown in Helpman et al. (2008), the shape parameter of a Pareto distribution uniquely deter-
mines the degree of inequality as measured by standard indexes of inequality, such as the coeﬃcient
of variation, the Gini coeﬃcient, or the Theil index. We use the Theil index to measure inequality,
because it permits an exact decomposition of aggregate inequality into within- and between-group
components (see Bourguignon 1979). This type of decomposition is important, because there are
several groups within each sector–the unemployed, workers employed by nonexporters, and work-
ers employed by exporters–and aggregate inequality depends on the allocation of workers across









dG  ( ), (27)
where   is income, ¯   is mean income,  dG  ( )/¯   is the income share of the  -type individuals,
while ln( /¯  ) is approximately equal to the proportional deviation of   from mean income.
One important property of the wage distributions (23)-(25) is that in the two limiting cases
of ρ =0(no ﬁrm exports) and ρ =1(all ﬁrms export), the wage distribution is an untruncated
Pareto with shape parameter 1+1/μ. For an untruncated Pareto distribution with shape parameter







= μ − ln(1 + μ). (28)
It follows that in autarky the distribution of wages has the same degree of inequality as the dis-
t r i b u t i o no fw a g e si na no p e ne c o n o m yi nw h i c ha l lﬁrms export. Importantly, this result does
not depend on how diﬀerent the trading partners are in terms of labor market frictions, and the
argument applies to the home and foreign country alike.33 We have therefore shown
Lemma 1 In a trade equilibrium in which all ﬁrms export, wage inequality in the diﬀerentiated
sector is the same as in autarky.
Proof. The lemma follows immediately from the fact that the Theil index for an untruncated
Pareto distribution depends solely on the shape parameter of that distribution and is invariant to
the lower limit of that distribution, as shown in the Appendix.
We next show that the Theil index of the open economy wage distribution (23) is larger than
μ − ln(1 + μ) for 0 <ρ<1. This establishes that in a trade equilibrium in which some but not
all ﬁr m se x p o r t ,t h e r ei sm o r ew a g ei n e q u a l i t yi nt h ed i ﬀerentiated sector than in autarky. To
establish this result, consider Figure 2, which depicts the distribution function of wages Gw (w),
given in (23). This function equals zero for all wages lower than wd, which is the lowest wage paid























Figure 2: Cumulative distribution function of wages
in the industry; it rises for wages wd ≤ w ≤ wd/ρβk/δΓ paid by nonexporters; it is ﬂat for wages
wd/ρβk/δΓ ≤ w ≤ wdΥ
k(1−β)/δΓ
x /ρβk/δΓ; and it rises for wages w ≥ wdΥ
k(1−β)/δΓ
x /ρβk/δΓ paid by
exporters.




1+1/μ for w ≥ wc
d, which has the same shape parameter as the conditional wage distributions
for workers employed by nonexporters and exporters, and which has the same mean as the actual








As the counterfactual wage distribution, Gc
w (w), has the same shape parameter as Gw,d(w) and













That is, the lowest wage in the counterfactual distribution, wc
d, lies strictly between the wage
paid by the least productive ﬁrm in the industry, wd, and the wage paid by the least productive





. The intuition for these results is as follows. The lowest wage in the
counterfactual distribution, wc





, because with the same shape parameter as
the wage distribution for workers employed by exporters, the entire counterfactual wage distribution
would lie below the actual distribution of wages. This would imply that Gc
w (w) would ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominate Gw (w), contradicting the requirement that the two distributions have the
same mean. Similarly, the lowest wage in the counterfactual distribution, wc
d, cannot lie below wd,
22because this would imply that the mean of Gc
w (w) would be less than the mean of Gw (w).34
In addition, the slope of the counterfactual wage distribution is smaller than the slope of the





, as shown in the Appendix. As a result, the relative location of
the two distributions is as depicted in Figure 2: the actual and counterfactual distributions intersect
only once and the actual distribution is above the counterfactual distribution for low wages and
below it for high wages.35 This last property is suﬃcient to establish the following result:
Lemma 2 Let 0 <ρ<1. Then the counterfactual wage distribution Gc
w (w) strictly second-order
stochastically dominates the actual wage distribution Gw (w).
Proof. See the Appendix.
By construction, the actual and counterfactual wage distributions have the same mean ¯ w,a n d
therefore from the deﬁnition of the Theil index in (27) the diﬀerence in wage inequality between













Since the function wlnw is strictly convex and the counterfactual wage distribution, Gc
w (w), strictly
second-order stochastically dominates the actual wage distribution, Gw (w), it follows that the Theil
index of the actual wage distribution, Tw, is strictly greater than the Theil index of the counter-
factual wage distribution, Tc
w. However, the Theil index of the counterfactual wage distribution is
the same as the Theil index of the distribution of wages in a closed economy, since both are un-
truncated Pareto distributions w i t ht h es a m es h a p ep a r a m e t e r ,1+1/μ, as noted above. Therefore
wage inequality in the closed economy is strictly lower than in a trade equilibrium in which some
but not all ﬁrms export (0 <ρ<1).36 These results imply37




































, as shown in Figure 2, or below it. In both cases the actual and counterfactual distributions have the
properties discussed in the text.
36Note that this argument does not rely on the particular inequality index used. The degree of inequality in the
counterfactual wage distribution is the same as in autarky since the shape parameter of the (untruncated) Pareto
distribution is a suﬃcient statistic for inequality under all scale-independent measures of inequality. In addition,
the counterfactual wage distribution second-order stochastically dominates the actual wage distribution in a trade
equilibrium in which only some ﬁrms export, which is a general criterion of greater equality of outcomes. Putting
these two arguments together implies that wage inequality in a trade equilibrium in which only some ﬁrms export is
greater than in autarky for a general class of inequality measures.
37In addition, the Appendix shows that wage inequality in the diﬀerentiated sector can be decomposed into within
and between components for workers employed by exporters and nonexporters. While average inequality within
groups decreases with trade, this eﬀect is dominated by increasing inequality between the two groups of workers.
23Proposition 2 Wage inequality is strictly greater in the trade equilibrium than in autarky when
some but not all ﬁrms export, and the two distributions have the same degree of inequality when all
ﬁrms export.
Proof. Follows from the above discussion.
This is a key proposition, which establishes that trade raises wage inequality in the diﬀerentiated
sector. Moreover, in the limiting cases in which either no ﬁrm exports (ρ =0 )o ra l lﬁrms export
(ρ =1 ), wage inequality is the same, which implies that wage inequality is the same in autarky as
in a trade equilibrium in which all ﬁrms export. As a result, a given change in fundamentals–such
as trade costs or labor market frictions–that raises the fraction of exporting ﬁrms, raises wage
inequality when a small fraction of ﬁrms export (low ρ) but reduces wage inequality when a large
fraction of ﬁrms export (high ρ). In other words, the relationship between trade openness and wage
inequality is nonmonotonic. Therefore, while wage inequality is higher in a trade equilibrium than
in autarky, once the economy is open to trade a given change in trade openness can either raise or
reduce wage inequality. We summarize these results as follows:
Corollary (to Proposition 2) An increase in the fraction of exporting ﬁr m sr a i s e sw a g ei n -
equality in the diﬀerentiated sector when the fraction of exporting ﬁr m si ss m a l l ,a n dr e d u c e sw a g e
inequality in the diﬀerentiated sector when the fraction of exporting ﬁr m si sl a r g e .
Proof. With a Pareto productivity distribution, the fraction of exporting ﬁrms is ρz.A sρ → 0,
wage inequality in the trade equilibrium converges to its autarky value, and from Proposition 2 a
small increase in ρ raises wage inequality in the diﬀerentiated sector. As ρ → 1,w a g ei n e q u a l i t y
in the trade equilibrium also converges to the same value as in autarky, and from Proposition 2 a
small decrease in ρ raises wage inequality in the diﬀerentiated sector.
The nonmonotonic relationship between trade openness and wage inequality is illustrated in
Figure 3.38 The Theil index is the same for ρ =0and ρ =1 , and it is higher for values of ρ between
these extremes. In the ﬁgure, the measure of inequality is single-peaked, so that inequality rises
with ρ for all values of ρ below the value that maximizes inequality, and declines with ρ for all
higher values.39
3.3 Unemployment in the Diﬀerentiated Sector
The presence of search frictions in the diﬀerentiated sector gives rise to equilibrium unemployment.
Workers can be unemployed either because they are not sampled by a ﬁrm, or because once sampled
they are not hired as a result of their ability falling below the ﬁrm’s ability cutoﬀ.T h e r a t e o f
38In this ﬁgure, we vary the ﬁxed exporting cost fx, holding constant the variable trade cost τ. With symmetric




39While Tw has a single peak in Figure 3, and this property has been found in all of our simulations, we have not
been able to establish the existence of a single peak analytically.


























Figure 3: Theil index of sectoral wage inequality
unemployment in the diﬀerentiated sector, u, can therefore be expressed as one minus the product
of the sectoral tightness of the labor market, x ≡ N/L, and the sectoral hiring rate, σ ≡ H/N,
where H is the mass of employed workers, N is the mass of workers matched with ﬁrms before the










In contrast, with no search frictions in the homogeneous sector, the rate of unemployment in that
sector is equal to zero.40
The sectoral tightness of the labor market, x =1 /b,w a sd e t e r m i n e da b o v e( s e e( 2 0 ) ) ,w h i l et h e


















Using the solutions for ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables in equation (22), and evaluating the integrals in the
expression for σ above using the Pareto productivity distribution, we can solve explicitly for the
40The key simplifying feature introduced by the homogeneous sector is the determination of expected worker
income and not the absence of unemployment in this sector. See Helpman and Itskhoki (2008) for an introduction
of unemployment into the homogeneous sector. While sectoral unemployment in the model is deﬁned in terms
of workers who were unsuccessful in their search for employment in a sector, the empirical measures constructed
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are deﬁned in terms of workers who are currently unemployed and were
previously employed in a sector. In a dynamic model with job destruction and a constant labor force in each sector,
these measures would coincide. The BLS data reports signiﬁcant variation of unemployment across sectors. For
example, in 2007 Mining had an unemployment rate of 3.4%; Construction, 7.4%; and Manufacturing, 4.3% (see
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat26.pdf, accessed on April 25, 2008).





























is the autarky hiring rate, obtained when ρ → 0 (see also Helpman et al. 2008). Note that, as with
sectoral wage inequality, the endogenous variables of the model aﬀect sectoral unemployment only
through the trade openness and market access variables, ρ and Υx. In a trade equilibrium in which
some ﬁrms export 0 <ρ≤ 1, and the term in front of σA o nt h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 3 0 )i ss t r i c t l y
less than one. Therefore σ<σ A. As trade does not aﬀect tightness in the labor market, x, but
raises unemployment through a reduction of the hiring rate, σ, equations (29) and (30) imply
Proposition 3 In the diﬀerentiated sector, the hiring rate is strictly lower and the unemployment
rate is strictly higher in a trade equilibrium than in autarky.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Therefore, moving from autarky to a trade equilibrium necessarily increases sectoral unemployment
in the diﬀerentiated sector, and this holds for symmetric and asymmetric countries alike. The
intuition for this result is as follows. Starting from autarky, the opening of trade increases the
revenue and employment of high-productivity ﬁrms that enter the export market. As revenue and
employment rise at high-productivity exporting ﬁrms, diminishing marginal returns to the number
of employed workers lead these ﬁrms to become more selective in their recruitment policies, which
increases equilibrium unemployment. Furthermore, the increase in revenue of high-productivity
exporting ﬁrms leads to increased entry in the diﬀerentiated sector, which reduces the revenue
and employment of low-productivity ﬁrms that serve only the domestic market. Although this
decline in revenue and employment at low-productivity ﬁrms leads them to become less selective in
their recruitment policies, there is a change in industry composition from low- to high-productivity
ﬁrms. As more productive ﬁrms are more selective (screen to a higher ability cutoﬀ), this change
in industry composition raises sectoral unemployment. The net result is higher unemployment.
On the other hand, the relationship between trade openness and sectoral unemployment, like
the relationship between trade openness and sectoral wage inequality, can be nonmonotonic. In
other words, once the economy is open to trade, a given change in trade openness can either in-
crease or decrease sectoral unemployment. The reason is as follows. Initially, only high-productivity
ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to export. A reduction in trade costs increases the revenue of these high-
productivity exporters and reduces the revenue of low-productivity ﬁr m st h a tc o n t i n u et os e r v e
only the domestic market. Both of these eﬀects raise sectoral unemployment, as explained above.
26However, a reduction in trade costs also induces lower-productivity ﬁrms to enter the export mar-
ket. As these new entrants to the export market are less productive than the incumbent exporters,
they have less selective recruitment policies than the incumbents. Therefore there is a change in
composition within the group of exporters from ﬁrms with more- to ﬁrms with less-selective re-
cruitment policies, which reduces equilibrium unemployment. Depending on parameter values, this
change in composition within the group of exporting ﬁrms can overwhelm the previously discussed
eﬀects. We have simulated examples in which the sectoral unemployment rate is monotonically
increasing with the trade openness variable ρ, as well as examples in which this relationship has
an inverted U-shape; unemployment increases initially with ρ and decreases after reaching a peak
close to ρ =1 .41
3.4 Income Inequality in the Diﬀerentiated Sector
The sectoral distribution of income depends not only on the distribution of wages across employed
workers, but also on the probability of being unemployed. Recall that only a fraction H/L = σx of
the workers seeking employment in the diﬀerentiated sector are hired, while the remaining fraction
1 − σx become unemployed and receive zero income. To characterize sectoral income inequality,
we use the property of the Theil index that it can be decomposed into within- and between-group
components for the two groups of employed and unemployed workers. Using this property, the
Theil index for income inequality in the diﬀerentiated sector, Tι, can be expressed solely in terms
of the Theil index of sectoral wage inequality, Tw (derived above), and the unemployment rate, u
(see Appendix):42
Tι = Tw − ln(1 − u).( 3 1 )
That is, income inequality is increasing in inequality among employed wage-earners and in the
unemployment rate. The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side captures within-group inequality. As
the unemployed all receive the same income of zero, they make no contribution to within-group
inequality, which therefore equals the Theil index of wage inequality among the employed. The
second term on the right-hand side represents between-group inequality, because the requirement
that workers are indiﬀerent across sectors implies that the average wage in the diﬀerentiated sector
is inversely related to the unemployment rate.
As we have already established that both sectoral wage inequality and the sectoral unemploy-
ment rate are higher in a trade equilibrium than in autarky, it follows that the opening of trade
also increases sectoral income inequality.
41See the Appendix for a discussion of the parameter values. As explained in footnote 35, this exercise corresponds
t oam o v e m e n ti nﬁxed exporting cost, fx,w h e nc o u n t r i e sa r es y m m e t r i c .I nr e s p o n s et oar e d u c t i o ni nt h ev a r i a b l e
trade cost, τ, there is an additional increase in the market access variable, Υx, on top of the increase in the openness
variable, ρ. The Appendix proves that the sectoral unemployment rate increases monotonically in Υx.A sar e s u l t ,a
reduction in τ is more likely to lead to an increase in sectoral unemployment than a reduction in fx will. Moreover,
in all our simulations, the sectoral unemployment rate was monotonically decreasing in τ, yet we have not been able
to prove this result analytically. See Section 4 and the Appendix for more details.
42A similar decomposition is available for the Gini coeﬃcient (see Helpman et al. 2008).
27Proposition 4 The distribution of income in the diﬀerentiated sector is more unequal in a trade
equilibrium than in autarky.
Proof. The proposition follows immediately from Propositions 2 and 3 together with the expression
for sectoral income inequality in (31), which is derived in the Appendix.
Now, once the economy is open to international trade, the fact that changes in trade openness have
ambiguous eﬀects on wage inequality and unemployment implies that they also have ambiguous
eﬀects on income inequality. Therefore, a change in trade openness can either increase or decrease
income inequality within the diﬀerentiated sector.
Moving from autarky to the trade equilibrium raises income inequality in the diﬀerentiated
sector through two channels. First, the partitioning of ﬁrms by productivity into nonexporters
and exporters, and the discrete increase in wages paid by exporting ﬁrms raise sectoral wage
inequality. Second, the change in ﬁrm composition towards more productive ﬁrms with more
selective recruitment policies reduces the sectoral hiring rate and increases sectoral unemployment.
Therefore, although the opening of trade leads to unambiguous welfare gains, there is an increase
in social disparity. While some workers gain from the higher wages paid by exporting ﬁrms, other
workers lose from the lower wages paid by ﬁrms serving only the domestic market and from the
rise of unemployment.43
3.5 Aggregate Unemployment and Inequality
Having characterized the relationship between trade, unemployment and inequality in the diﬀeren-
tiated sector, we are now in a position to analyze the impact of trade on aggregate unemployment
and inequality. The key diﬀerence between the analysis at the sectoral and aggregate levels is that,
in the aggregate analysis, the impact of trade on sectoral composition, i.e., the allocation of workers
across sectors, needs to be taken into account.
We begin by considering the aggregate unemployment rate, u, which can be expressed as a
weighted average of the rates of unemployment in the homogeneous and diﬀerentiated sectors.44
With no unemployment in the homogeneous sector, the aggregate rate of unemployment is therefore






As we have already established that u is higher in the trade equilibrium than in autarky, a suﬃcient
condition for the aggregate rate of unemployment to rise is for L to be higher in the trade equilibrium
43Since the opening of trade leads to an increase in θd, ﬁrms that remain in business but cannot proﬁtably export
experience a reduction in revenues and hence in wages (from (22)). The workers employed by these ﬁrms can however
still experience an increase in welfare, because the opening of trade reduces the price of the consumption bundle
through its eﬀect on the price index for the diﬀerentiated good.
44We use bold symbols to denote aggregate variables; thus u is the rate of unemployment in the diﬀerentiated
sector, while u is the aggregate rate of unemployment.
28than in autarky. In general, the opening of trade can either raise or reduce the labor force in the
diﬀerentiated sector. Furthermore, the reduction in L can outweigh the increase in u so as to
reduce aggregate unemployment. Therefore, aggregate unemployment in the trade equilibrium can
be either higher or lower than in autarky. However, if the two countries are suﬃciently similar, the
increase in average productivity in the diﬀerentiated sector caused by the opening of trade expands
the labor force in this sector in both countries, and hence raises aggregate unemployment in both
countries. We note that this condition is suﬃcient but not necessary, as aggregate unemployment
can rise following the opening of trade even if the labor force in the diﬀerentiated sector contracts.45
To characterize aggregate income inequality, we again exploit the property of the Theil index
that it can be decomposed into within and between-group components, where the groups are now
the labor forces in the homogeneous and diﬀerentiated sectors. As average (or expected) income
in both sectors is equal to one, between-group income inequality is equal to zero. Hence aggregate
income inequality depends solely on within-group inequality, which is equal to the weighted average
of the Theil indices of the two sectors, using income shares (which equal labor shares) as weights.
Additionally, since all workers in the homogeneous sector receive the same income of one, the Theil
index of income inequality in the homogeneous sector equals zero. Therefore, the Theil index of
aggregate income inequality, Tι, is simply equal to the Theil index of income inequality in the





This expression has a similar form to the expression for aggregate unemployment in (32), and can
therefore be analyzed in the same way. In general, aggregate income inequality can be either higher
or lower in the trade equilibrium than in autarky. However, a suﬃcient condition for aggregate
income inequality to rise as a result of opening to foreign trade is for L to rise, because income
inequality in the diﬀerentiated sector is higher in the trade equilibrium than in autarky (Proposition
4). As long as the two countries are suﬃciently similar, the opening of trade expands the labor
force in the diﬀerentiated sector in both countries, and thereby raises aggregate inequality in both
countries. We summarize these results in
Proposition 5 As long as countries are suﬃciently similar, aggregate unemployment and aggregate
income inequality are higher in both countries in the trade equilibrium than in autarky.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To characterize aggregate wage inequality, we use the result in (31) that links income inequality
45Empirically, relocations within sectors appear to be larger than relocations across sectors. Under these circum-
stances compositional eﬀects on unemployment and inequality should be limited, and unemployment and inequality
should be shaped by within-sectoral eﬀects. Also note that the impact of L on aggregate unemployment depends on
which sector has the higher sectoral rate of unemployment. While we have assumed for simplicity that the homoge-
neous sector has has zero unemployment, if it instead had a positive rate of unemployment, an increase in L would
raise the aggregate rate of unemployment if and only if the unemployment rate in the homogeneous sector were lower
than in the diﬀerentiated sector. See Helpman and Itskhoki (2008) for an analysis of sectoral compositional eﬀects.
29to wage inequality and the unemployment rate. This result holds at the aggregate and sectoral
levels alike, and therefore Tι = Tw−ln(1−u) and Tι = Tw−ln(1−u). Combining these expressions
with aggregate income inequality (33) and aggregate unemployment (32), we obtain:













ln(1 − u). (34)
Comparing (33) with (34) one can see that the analysis of aggregate wage inequality involves
additional considerations to the analysis of aggregate income inequality. In particular, although
there is zero between-group income inequality for workers in the homogeneous and diﬀerentiated
sectors, because average income is the same across sectors, there is positive between-group wage
inequality because of the higher average wage in the diﬀerentiated sector. As a result, the opening
of trade aﬀects aggregate wage inequality in (34) through several channels. First, from Proposition
2, the opening of trade raises wage inequality in the diﬀerentiated sector, Tw, which increases
aggregate wage inequality. Second, from Proposition 3, the opening of trade raises unemployment
in the diﬀerentiated sector, u, which also increases aggregate wage inequality. The intuition for
the second result is that in order for workers to remain indiﬀerent between sectors, the higher
unemployment rate in the diﬀerentiated sector must be compensated for by a higher average wage,
which increases the wage gap between the homogeneous- and diﬀerentiated-good sectors. Third,
the opening of trade aﬀects aggregate wage inequality through the share of the labor force in the
diﬀerentiated sector, L/¯ L. While in general L/¯ L can either rise or fall following the opening of
trade, we know that it rises in both countries when they are suﬃciently similar. However, from
(34), such an expansion in the labor force in the diﬀerentiated sector can itself either increase
or diminish aggregate wage inequality, depending on the initial size of the diﬀerentiated sector.
When the diﬀerentiated sector is small, i.e., L/¯ L is small, an increase in L raises aggregate wage
inequality. Intuitively, the increase in L shifts workers towards the high average wage sector, which
raises aggregate wage inequality when this sector accounts for a small share of the labor force. In
contrast, when the diﬀerentiated sector is large, i.e., L/¯ L is large, an increase in L raises aggregate
wage inequality for low rates of unemployment (low average wages) in the diﬀerentiated sector, but
reduces aggregate wage inequality for high rates of unemployment (relatively high average wages)
in the diﬀerentiated sector.46 Therefore, even in the case of symmetric countries, the model predicts
a nuanced relationship between the opening of trade and aggregate wage inequality. On the other
hand, when sectoral composition eﬀects are small, aggregate wage inequality is higher in a trade














For L =0the right-hand side of this equation is positive, because −ln(1 − u)−u>0 for all 0 <u<1.A tt h eo t h e r
extreme, when L = ¯ L, the right-hand side of this equation is positive for low values of u and negative for values of u
close to one, because −ln(1 − u) − u/(1 − u) is negative for all 0 <u<1, but it is close to zero for small values of
u and it approaches minus inﬁnity when u approaches 1.
304 Determinants of Unemployment and Inequality
While previous sections examined how opening up to foreign trade inﬂuences a country’s unemploy-
ment and inequality, in this section we examine how, in a trade equilibrium, unemployment and
inequality are inﬂuenced by exogenous parameters. Despite the model’s richness, its comparative
statics can be characterized in closed-form for small asymmetries in the neighborhood of a symmet-
ric equilibrium, as shown formally in the Appendix. While we concentrate our discussion on trade
costs and labor market frictions, the comparative statics analysis undertaken in the Appendix can
also be used to consider the impact of other parameters.
We have already established that sectoral unemployment and inequality have a nonmonotonic
relationship with openness to trade. Additionally, we have shown that aggregate unemployment
and inequality can move in quite diﬀerent ways from their sectoral counterparts, depending on
changes in sectoral composition. Both of these results suggest that the impact of a change in
model parameters on unemployment and inequality is likely to be ambiguous at both the sectoral
and aggregate levels, as will indeed prove to be the case. Nonetheless, in the neighborhood of an
equilibrium in which only a small fraction of ﬁrms export (ρ ≈ 0) and asymmetries between the two
countries are small (b ≈ b∗ and c ≈ c∗), unambiguous predictions for the eﬀects of the variable trade
cost and labor market frictions on unemployment and inequality can be derived. Although ρ ≈ 0
is a special case, it is an interesting special case because the evidence shows that in most sectors
only a small fraction of ﬁrms export. In the remainder of this section we derive comparative statics
results in the neighborhood of such an equilibrium, which also illuminates forces at work in the
model. Having completed this characterization, we return to discuss the more general relationships
between unemployment, inequality and model parameters.
As a ﬁrst step, recall from Section 3 that sectoral wage inequality, Tw, and unemployment, u,
only depend on endogenous variables through trade openness, ρ, and market access, Υx.T h e s e
latter two variables are linked through the equilibrium conditions of the model. Speciﬁcally, dividing










This expression implies that if fx is held constant, ρ and Υx move in the same direction in response
to changes in the variable trade cost and both countries’ labor market frictions. Therefore, holding
the ﬁxed cost of exporting constant, we can characterize sectoral wage inequality and unemployment
in terms of trade openness, ρ, which is monotonically related to the fraction of ﬁrms that export,
ρz.47
We use this result to examine the comparative statics of changes in the variable trade cost
and labor market frictions. Our analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we use (35) to obtain an
expression for sectoral wage inequality and unemployment in terms of trade openness, ρ, for an
equilibrium in which only a small fraction of ﬁrms export (ρ ≈ 0). Second, we use the model’s
47As is evident from (35), changes in the ﬁxed cost of trade aﬀect the relationship between ρ and Υx.
31comparative statics for small asymmetries between the two countries (b ≈ b∗ and c ≈ c∗)t o
determine the impact of changes in the variable trade cost and labor market frictions on trade
openness, ρ. Combining these two stages, we can relate sectoral wage inequality and unemployment
to the exogenous parameters of the model.
For the ﬁrst stage, we take a Taylor series approximation of sectoral wage inequality, Tw,a n d
the sectoral hiring rate, σ, which implies
Lemma 3 Tw ∼ μ − ln(1 + μ) −
βkfx






when ρ ≈ 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In an equilibrium in which a small fraction of ﬁrms export, Lemma 3 implies that sectoral wage
inequality is increasing in the fraction of ﬁrms that export. Since z>2, it follows that sectoral wage
inequality is monotonically increasing in trade openness in the neighborhood of such an equilibrium.
In an equilibrium of this type, the sectoral hiring rate, σ, is increasing in the autarkic hiring rate,
σA, and decreasing in the fraction of ﬁrms that export, ρz. As sectoral unemployment, u =1−σx,
is decreasing in the sectoral hiring rate, it follows that sectoral unemployment is monotonically
increasing in trade openness in the neighborhood of such an equilibrium.
Having established that sectoral wage inequality and sectoral unemployment are both increasing
in trade openness when a small fraction of ﬁrms export, we now turn to examining the relationship
between trade openness and the exogenous parameters of the model. We show
Lemma 4 When the two countries are nearly symmetric (b ≈ b∗ and c ≈ c∗), ρ decreases in τ,
b/b∗ and c/c∗.
Proof. See the Appendix.
>From Lemma 4, a lower variable cost of trade, lower home labor market frictions, and higher
foreign labor market frictions increase home’s trade openness and its fraction of ﬁrms that export.
The intuition for these results is as follows. First, a lower variable trade cost, τ, raises export
market revenue relative to domestic market revenue, which increases the fraction of home ﬁrms
that export (a rise in ρ). Second, lower home labor market frictions increase real consumption
in the diﬀerentiated sector in home relative to that sector in foreign. This in turn intensiﬁes
product market competition in the home market relative to that in the foreign market, which
makes exporting more attractive and increases the fraction of home ﬁr m st h a te x p o r t( ar i s ei nρ).
Third, lower labor market frictions in the foreign country have precisely the opposite eﬀect (a fall
in ρ). Indeed, Lemma 4 implies that when the two countries are nearly symmetric, trade openness
depends on relative labor market frictions in the two countries.48 Finally, the two dimensions of
labor market friction, search cost, b, and screening cost, c, have similar eﬀects on trade openness
48Note that a proportional change in labor market frictions in two symmetric countries, which keeps b = b
∗ and
c = c
∗,h a sn oe ﬀect on trade openness, because in this case Υx =1+τ
−β/(1−β) is independent of labor market
frictions, and therefore from (35), ρ is also independent of labor market frictions.
32in this case, because an increase in either dimension of labor market friction leads to a reduction
in the size of the diﬀerentiated sector.
Now that we have examined how sectoral wage inequality and unemployment are related to
trade openness, and have also examined how trade openness is related to the exogenous parameters
of the model, we are in a position to state the following:
Proposition 6 Consider an equilibrium in which a small fraction of ﬁrms export in the diﬀeren-
tiated sector (ρ ≈ 0) and the two countries face similar levels of labor market frictions (b ≈ b∗ and
c ≈ c∗). Then: (i) a reduction in the variable trade cost increases wage inequality and unemploy-
ment in the diﬀerentiated sector of every country; (ii) a rise in the foreign country’s labor market
frictions or a reduction in the home country’s labor market frictions increase wage inequality in
the home country’s diﬀerentiated sector and reduce wage inequality in the foreign country’s diﬀer-
entiated sector; (iii) a rise in the foreign country’s labor market frictions raises unemployment in
the home country, while a rise in the home country’s labor market frictions raises unemployment
in the foreign country; and (iv) a rise in a country’s labor market frictions can raise or reduce its
own rate of unemployment.
Proof. The impacts of changes in the variable trade cost and labor market frictions on sectoral
wage inequality and unemployment in the diﬀerentiated sector follow from Lemmas 3 and 4 together
with the determinants of labor market tightness in (20) and unemployment in (30).
The comparative statics for sectoral wage inequality in Proposition 6 are intuitive. Lower variable
trade costs, lower home labor market frictions, or higher foreign labor market frictions raise the
fraction of home ﬁrms that export. Starting from an equilibrium in which a small fraction of
ﬁrms export, this increase in the fraction of exporters raises home sectoral wage inequality, because
exporters pay higher wages than nonexporters.
The comparative statics of sectoral unemployment in Proposition 6 are more subtle. The
variable trade cost and foreign labor market frictions only aﬀect sectoral unemployment in home
through trade openness and the fraction of ﬁrms that export. Therefore a lower variable trade
cost and higher foreign labor market frictions increase sectoral unemployment in home by raising
the fraction of ﬁrms that export. In contrast, home’s labor market frictions aﬀect its sectoral
unemployment rate through its autarkic sectoral hiring rate, σA, the tightness of its labor market,
x, and its fraction of ﬁrms that export, ρz. As a result, the impact of a reduction in home’s labor
market friction depends on whether this reduction arises from a lower screening cost, c,o ral o w e r
search cost, b. On the one hand, a lower home screening cost reduces the autarkic sectoral hiring
rate and increases the fraction of ﬁrms that export, both of which raise sectoral unemployment
in the home country. On the other hand, a lower home search cost increases the tightness of the
labor market and the fraction of ﬁrms that export. While the increase in tightness reduces sectoral
unemployment, the increase in the fraction of ﬁrms that export raises sectoral unemployment. The
net eﬀect of a lower home search cost on sectoral unemployment is therefore ambiguous.
33Having established how changes in the exogenous parameters aﬀect sectoral wage inequality
and unemployment, it is straightforward to derive their eﬀect on sectoral income inequality (31).
Lower variable trade costs, higher foreign labor market frictions and lower home screening frictions
r a i s eh o m es e c t o r a li n c o m ei n e q u a l i t y ,b e c a u s et hey increase both sectoral wage inequality and
unemployment. In contrast, lower home search frictions have an ambiguous eﬀect on home sectoral
income inequality, because they raise wage inequality but have an ambiguous eﬀect on sectoral
unemployment.
To examine how the exogenous parameters of the model inﬂuence aggregate unemployment
and aggregate income inequality, we need to take into account changes in sectoral composition.
In the Appendix, we derive comparative statics for the size of the diﬀerentiated sector in the
neighborhood of an equilibrium with only small asymmetries between the two countries (b ≈ b∗ and
c ≈ c∗). From this analysis, lower variable trade costs increase aggregate unemployment and income
inequality in both countries. The reason is that they not only increase sectoral unemployment and
income inequality, as discussed above, but also increase the share of the labor force employed in the
diﬀerentiated sector, which has higher unemployment and income inequality than the homogeneous
sector.
In contrast, relative labor market frictions in the two countries aﬀect sectoral composition
through comparative advantage. A reduction in labor market frictions in home relative to those in
foreign causes the share of the labor force employed in the diﬀerentiated sector to expand in home
and contract in foreign. Therefore higher foreign labor market frictions and lower home screening
frictions increase home aggregate unemployment and income inequality. These parameter changes
not only raise home sectoral unemployment and income inequality, as discussed above, but also raise
the share of the home country’s labor force employed in the high unemployment and high income
inequality sector. In contrast, lower home search frictions have an ambiguous eﬀect on aggregate
unemployment and income inequality. Although they increase the share of the labor force employed
in the high unemployment and high income inequality sector, they have an ambiguous eﬀect on
unemployment and income inequality within this sector, as discussed above.
Finally, comparative statics can also be derived for aggregate wage inequality, but are somewhat
more nuanced. As discussed in Section 3.5, a change in the share of the labor force employed in
the diﬀerentiated sector has an ambiguous eﬀect on aggregate wage inequality, depending on the
initial share of this sector in the labor force. Therefore the impact of changes in parameters on
aggregate wage inequality is in general ambiguous. This completes our characterization of the
model’s comparative statics for equilibria in which only a small fraction of ﬁrms export (ρ ≈ 0)
and asymmetries between the two countries are small (b ≈ b∗ and c ≈ c∗).
We now turn to consider the case in which an arbitrary fraction of ﬁr m se x p o r ta n dt h et w o
countries have arbitrary levels of labor market frictions. In this case there is a nonmonotonic
relationship between sectoral unemployment and inequality and the exogenous parameters of the
























Figure 4: Wage inequality as a function of the variable trade cost
model.49 This nonmonotonicity arises in both stages of our analysis: the impact of trade openness
on sectoral wage inequality and unemployment, and the impact of exogenous parameters on trade
openness. For the ﬁrst stage of the analysis, the Corollary to Proposition 2 has already established
that a rise in trade openness can increase sectoral wage inequality when the fraction of exporting
ﬁrms is small and can decrease sectoral wage inequality when the fraction of exporting ﬁrms is
large. For the second stage of the analysis, the nonmonotonic impact of exogenous parameters on
trade openness can be seen from the relationship in (35) between ρ and Υx. As market access
depends on relative real consumption of the diﬀerentiated product in the two countries (see (15)),
it depends on the full general equilibrium of the model. Therefore the relationship between trade
openness and any one parameter depends, through the full general equilibrium of the model, on the
values of all the other parameters. In Figures 4 and 5 we provide examples for particular parameter
values in which sectoral wage inequality has a nonmonotonic relationship with the variable trade
cost, τ, and the home country’s search cost, b, respectively.50
These results have several implications for empirical work on the relationship between openness
to trade, unemployment, and inequality. The robust predictions of the model are the propositions
concerning the opening of a closed economy to international trade in Section 3, which were derived
without making assumptions about the fraction of exporting ﬁr m so rt h el e v e lo fl a b o rm a r k e t
frictions in the two countries. Once an economy is open to international trade, however, the rela-
tionships between unemployment, inequality, and trade openness become subtle and depend on the
initial equilibrium. Helpman and Itskhoki (2008) pointed out already that cross-country diﬀerences
in rates of unemployment need not be positively correlated with cross-country diﬀerences in labor
market frictions, and this warning also applies in our more general model. Moreover, because we
49Nevertheless, it is possible to derive some general relationships between unemployment and the model’s parame-
ters, as discussed in the Appendix.
50See the Appendix for further details.
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Figure 5: Wage inequality as a function of the home country’s search cost
allow ﬁrms to screen workers, diﬀerences in screening costs across countries have an independent
eﬀect on unemployment, which can be in the opposite direction to search costs. As for inequality,
which has not been studied by Helpman and Itskhoki (2008), our theoretical ﬁndings imply that
estimates of the relationship between the degree of openness and inequality need, at a minimum,
to allow for nonlinearities with positive and negative eﬀects. In other words, the marginal impact
of trade openness on inequality should be allowed to vary across countries conditional on their
exposure to foreign trade. Formulating estimates that do not allow for this type of heterogeneity
is likely to lead to misleading results.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The relationship between globalization and inequality is one of the most contested topics in eco-
nomics. Traditionally, research has approached this issue from the perspective of neoclassical trade
theory with its emphasis on specialization across industries and changes in relative factor rewards.
In this paper we propose an alternative framework that explicitly recognizes heterogeneity across
ﬁrms and workers within industries as well as labor market frictions. Both features are realistic
aspects of economies and their inclusion yields interesting predictions for the eﬀects of globalization
on inequality. In contrast to traditional trade theory, our framework predicts that trade liberal-
ization can enhance income inequality in both developed and developing countries; these changes
are driven by residual inequality that is unexplained by observed characteristics; income inequality
is inﬂuenced by wage inequality and unemployment; and both dimensions of income inequality
depend on reallocations of workers across ﬁrms within industries as well as reallocations of workers
across industries.
Our central theoretical results relate to the opening of a closed economy to international trade.
While both countries experience welfare gains from trade, unemployment and inequality within
36the diﬀerentiated sector are higher in a trade equilibrium in which only some ﬁrms export than
in autarky. The intuition is that trade changes industry composition by reallocating resources
from low- to high-productivity ﬁrms, which pay discretely higher wages and have more selective
recruitment policies. As a result, both wage inequality and unemployment within the diﬀerentiated
sector rise. Once an economy is open to international trade, however, the relationship between
wage inequality and trade openness is nonmonotonic. On the one hand, when nearly all ﬁrms serve
solely the domestic market, an increase in trade openness raises wage inequality by expanding
the small number of exporting ﬁrms that pay a wage premium. On the other hand, when nearly
all ﬁrms export, an increase in trade openness reduces wage inequality by further reducing the
small number of ﬁrms that serve only the domestic market and pay low wages. In the trade
equilibrium, the fraction of exporting ﬁrms and the wage premium paid by exporters depend on
labor market frictions in the two countries. Labor market frictions therefore aﬀect unemployment
and inequality within the diﬀerentiated sector as well as the allocation of resources across sectors.
Aggregate unemployment and inequality depend on the allocation of resources across sectors as well
as on unemployment and inequality within sectors, complicating the empirical relationship across
countries between unemployment, inequality, and trade openness.
While our model enables us to explore how trade liberalization aﬀects unemployment and in-
equality in general equilibrium, it is necessarily an abstraction, and there remain a number of areas
for further research. In our model, the eﬀect of trade liberalization on unemployment and inequality
varies with a worker’s unobserved ability. The reason is that more productive high-wage ﬁrms also
have more selective recruitment policies, and therefore do not employ some low-ability workers who
are employed by less productive low-wage ﬁrms. As a result, high-ability workers face diﬀerent wage
and employment distributions than low-ability workers, and therefore are diﬀerentially aﬀected by
trade liberalization. This relationship between worker ability and the eﬀects of trade liberalization
on unemployment and inequality is itself worthy of further inquiry. Additionally, while we focus
on changes in residual inequality, because this has been shown to be empirically important and
has received little attention in existing work in international trade, it would also be interesting to
consider multiple factors of production that diﬀer in observed characteristics. Finally, the model
could be extended to consider other dimensions of international integration, such as foreign direct
investment. The tractability of our framework lends itself to these and other extensions.
37Appendix
A Complete Closed-Form Solution
A.1 Division of Revenue in the Bargaining Game
Let w(θ,h) be the equilibrium wage that a θ-ﬁrm has to pay as a function of the measure of workers hired




when the workers’ outside option is zero, where r(θ,h) is the revenue from sales of the ﬁrm’s variety when







T h ew o r k e r ’ ss h a r eo fs u r p l u si si n c r e a s i n gi nβγ, that is decreasing in the concavity of the revenue function
in h,w h e r eβ comes from concavity of demand and γ comes from concavity of the production technology.
A more concave revenue function implies a smaller eﬀect of the departure of any given worker on ﬁrm
revenue. See Helpman and Itskhoki (2008) for a derivation of equilibrium wages in a model with ﬁring costs,
unemployment beneﬁts and unequal bargaining weights, and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) for a similar
result in a diﬀerent framework.
A.2 Problem of the Firm
Combining the two ﬁrst-order conditions (8) and (9) we obtain a relationship between n(θ) and ac(θ):
(1 − γk)bn(θ)=γcac(θ)δ.











































































































so that κr ≡ φ1φ
β(1−γk)






















































d − fd =0 ,
we can express all ﬁrm-level variables solely as functions of θ/θd, Υ(θ) and exogenous parameters of the
model. Doing so results in expression (22) in the text. Further, taking the ratio of the two conditions for












Finally, we derive the split of the revenue between domestic sales and exporting given in (14). The total
revenue of the ﬁrm is the sum of revenues in the two markets provided that the ﬁrm decides to export:
r(θ)=Q−(β−ζ)qd(θ)β + τ−βQ∗−(β−ζ)qx(θ)β,
where q(θ)=qd(θ)+qx(θ) is the total output of the ﬁrm which it splits between the two markets. Maxi-














= Υx − 1,












= Υx − 1.
39As a result, rd(θ)=r(θ)/Υx and rx(θ)=( Υx − 1)r(θ)/Υx for exporting ﬁrms, i.e. for θ ≥ θx.S i n c e f o r
nonexporting ﬁrms, rd(θ)=r(θ) and Υ(θ)=1 , the general optimal division rule in (14) follows.
A.3 General Equilibrium Conditions
As discussed in the main text, the ﬁrst block of equilibrium conditions consists of two cutoﬀ conditions–for
domestic production and for exporting–and the free entry condition in each country; they are given by
(16), (17) and (18) respectively. We provide here more details about the second block of the equilibrium
system which solves for the number of ﬁrm-entrants M and the measure of workers searching for a job in
the diﬀerentiated sector L. Using the equilibrium expressions for revenue from domestic sales and exports





































































w h e r ew eh a v ee v a l u a t e dt h ei n t e g r a l si nt h es q u a r eb r a c k e t su s i n gt h eP a r e t od i s t r i b u t i o na n da p p l i e dt h e
free entry condition (18). This condition implies that L/M is constant in any equilibrium and L and M are
equivalent measures of the size of the diﬀerentiated sector. Finally, observe that in a symmetric case the
expression for Qζ can be considerably simpliﬁed and the two expressions above become identical up to a
factor of βγ/(1 + βγ), as we discuss below.
A.4 Symmetric Countries Closed Form Solutions








































Since in a symmetric equilibrium Q = Q∗,w eh a v eΥx =1+τ−β/(1−β). Therefore, (37) deﬁnes θd in a
symmetric equilibrium. After solving for θd, θx can be obtained from (36).
Using (36) and (37), we can now derive the conditions on the parameters that ensure θx >θ d >θ min
in a symmetric equilibrium. Note that the square bracket in (37) is always greater than 1. Therefore, it is




to ensure that θd >θ min in any symmetric equilibrium. As stated in the text, high enough fd always ensures
40it. Next note from (36) that since Υ
(1−β)/Γ
x < 1, it is enough to require that fx ≥ fd to ensure θx >θ d
in any symmetric equilibrium, i.e., choose fx high enough. Note that the same condition applies in Melitz
(2003). Numerical simulations suggest that a much weaker condition is generally suﬃcient in this model.
Once we have established the equilibrium value of θd, we can solve for the real consumption index, Q,









Note that b and c do not aﬀect θd in the symmetric equilibrium, however, they impact real consumption Q
proportionally in both countries. Trade costs, on opposite, do not alter the relationship between Q and θd
in (38), however, they reduce both θd and Q via free entry condition (37).
Finally, knowing Q, we can solve for the mass of ﬁrm entrants M and the measure of workers searching





This completes the solution in the symmetric countries case.
A.5 Comparative Statics for Nearly Symmetric Countries
To obtain comparative statics, we take the ﬁrst block of the equilibrium system (16)-(18) together with the
deﬁnition of Υx in (15) and log-diﬀerentiate it around a symmetric equilibrium characterized above. We
obtain the following log-diﬀerentiated system:
ˆ θd =
β−ζ
β ˆ Q +( 1− γk)/δˆ c + γˆ b,















¡ ˆ Q∗ − ˆ Q
¢i
,
δdˆ θd + δxˆ θx =0 ,
where δs ≡ fs
R ∞
θs (θ/θs)β/ΓdGθ(θ) for s = d,x.T h eﬁrst of these equations comes from the domestic pro-
ductivity cutoﬀ condition (16); the second equation comes from the exporting productivity cutoﬀ condition
(17), which also takes into account (16) and the deﬁnition of Υx in (15); ﬁnally, the third condition is the
log-linearized version of the free entry condition (18).
To solve the system, we can eliminate ˆ θd and ˆ θx and rearrange to obtain:























A symmetric condition holds for the foreign country. Using them together we have a system of two equations
41in two unknowns, ( ˆ Q, ˆ Q∗), which yields:
ˆ Q = −
β/(β − ζ)








(1 − γk)/δˆ c∗ + γˆ b∗¢
+ Φ(1 − 2Φ∗)ˆ τ
i
.
Plugging this back into the equilibrium system, we obtain the comparative statics for production and ex-
porting cutoﬀs:








ˆ c − ˆ c∗¢
+ γ
¡ˆ b −ˆ b∗¢
+( 1− 2Φ∗)ˆ τ
i




Stability of the equilibrium system requires Φ + Φ∗ < 1 and for unambiguous comparative statics we need
Φ < 1/2 in both countries. We show below that this is indeed the case around the symmetric equilibrium,
and now discuss the implications of these comparative statics assuming that these conditions hold.
First, note that the two cutoﬀs move in opposite directions which is the immediate implication of the
free entry condition (18). Next observe that the cutoﬀs do not respond to proportional changes in the
labor market frictions which hold c/c∗ and b/b∗ constant. Reduction in trade impediments increases real
consumption Q and the domestic productivity cutoﬀ θd, while it lowers the export productivity cutoﬀ θx.
This implies that both countries gain from continuous reductions in trade barriers independently of labor
market frictions. Finally, improvements in labor market frictions enhance welfare at home (Q), but lower
it abroad (Q∗), while a proportional reduction in labor market frictions increases welfare in both countries.
This is a generalization of the results in Helpman and Itskhoki (2007).
We now discuss the implications of these comparative statics for the size of the labor force that seeks a
j o bi nt h ed i ﬀerentiated sector, L. This comparative statics is needed to evaluate the compositional eﬀects
on unemployment and inequality analyzed in Section 3.5. First of all, by adding (19) and (21) across the
countries, we obtain a relationship between the worldwide expenditure on the diﬀerentiated good and the
worldwide measure of workers attaching themselves to the diﬀerentiated sector:






When countries are symmetric, this condition holds for each country separately, but when they are asym-
metric and there is net trade in diﬀerentiated goods this conditions holds only for the world economy. Since
reduction in trade barriers raises Q in both countries, it has to raise the worldwide size of the labor force in
the diﬀerentiated sector, L+L∗. When countries are nearly symmetric, both L and L∗ increase in response
to a fall in τ. When the asymmetries between countries are large, one can show that L increases in the
country with more ﬂexible labor market institutions which has comparative advantage in the diﬀerentiated
sector. In addition, it is possible to show that under certain conditions a reduction in b and c or an increase
in b∗ and c∗ increase L and reduce L∗. We omit this tedious proof for brevity.
To complete the analysis, we show that Φ < 1/2 in the environ of a symmetric equilibrium. Using the



























42where the second equality comes from (36) and the inequality holds due to Υ
(1−β)/Γ
x − 1 < 1 and our
assumption that fx ≥ fd. This however is not enough to guarantee Φ < 1/2 since the remaining term is
























Note that when countries are symmetric, Υx =1+τ−β/(1−β) and, therefore, Φ < 1/2 that constitutes a valid
restriction on the exogenous parameters of the model. Moreover, as trade costs τ or fx increase, Φ decreases
towards 0. As a result, there always exists a lower bound on fx and τ such that for any higher trade costs
Φ < 1/2 is satisﬁed. To see how restrictive this requirement is, let us ﬁx fx = fd (recall that this is the
lowest level of fx in the Melitz (2003) model which ensures θx >θ d when τ is low). We also set the variable
trade cost, τ, to its lowest value of 1 and verify numerically that Φ < 1/2 holds for all admissible values of
z, β and Γ.51 Thus, we conclude that the condition Φ < 1/2 is not restrictive and, in particular, is implied
by the empirically motivated assumption that θx >θ d. By continuity, the same arguments apply when the
asymmetries between countries are small and numerical simulations suggest that generally Φ < 1/2 in both
countries even when asymmetries are large.
B Derivation of Results in Section 3
B.1 Derivation of Results in Section 3.2
B.1.1 Wage Distribution among Workers in Exporting and Nonexporting Firms




















where ρ ≡ θd/θx. To compute the distribution of wages across workers employed by non-exporting ﬁrms,






















where θw,d(·) is the inverse of w(·) and equal to θw,d(w)=θd
¡
w/wd
¢δΓ/(βk). Finally, for w<w d, Gw,d(w)=
0,a n df o rw>w d/ρβk/δΓ, Gw,d(w)=1 . Using the Pareto productivity distribution, the distribution of
51Note that Φ monotonically decreases in z. Therefore, we set it to its lowest value of z =2 . The restriction on the
parameters of the model imply Γ > 1 − β/2.W ee v a l u a t eΦ for all β ∈ (0,1) and Γ ∈ (1 − β/2,1) on a very detailed
grid. Φ → 1/2 when β → 0, but otherwise is separated from 1/2 and for the most part takes values around 0.2.





























where μ ≡ βk/[δ(zΓ − β)].































x /ρβk/δΓ, Gw,x(w)=0 . Using the Pareto productivity distribution, the distribution of wages



























Combining Sh,d, Gw,d(·) and Gw,x(·) together we obtain the unconditional wage distribution among
workers employed in the diﬀerentiated sector, Gw(w),a sd e ﬁned in (23).
B.1.2 Theil Index of Sectoral Wage Inequality among Workers in Exporting and Nonexport-
ing Firms
















lnwdGw,x(w) − ln ¯ wx,












w−(1+1/μ) lnwdw − lnwx − ln(1 + μ)=μ − ln(1 + μ).
Note that Tw,x is monotonically increasing in μ and Tw,x =0when μ =0 . Importantly, the Theil Index for the
untruncated Pareto distribution Gw,x(w) does not depend on the lower limit of the wage distribution wxand
depends only on the shape parameter, μ. As the distribution of wages under autarky is also an untruncated
Pareto with a lower limit of wd rather than wx, it follows that the Theil Index for wage inequality under
autarky takes the same value as the Theil index for wage inequality in a trade equilibrium in which all ﬁrms
export. This establishes the result in (28) and proves Lemma 1.
52We use the facts that G
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up to a constant
(where α>1).
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1 − ρz−β(1−k/δ)/Γ(1 + μ)wd
is the mean of Gw,d(·).A s ρ → 1 (i.e., there are no nonexporting ﬁrms), Tw,d → 0,a n da sρ → 0 (i.e.,
all ﬁrms are nonexporting), Tw,d → μ − ln(1 + μ) as the conditional distribution of wages converges to the
autarkic distribution. For intermediate values of ρ ∈ (0,1), 0 <T w,d <μ− ln(1 + μ). Therefore, there is
less inequality among workers employed in non-exporting ﬁrms than among workers employed in exporting
ﬁrms.
B.1.3 Within and Between Inequality
We can decompose the wage inequality index of all employed in the diﬀerentiated sector into the within
and between components for the two groups of workers–employed in exporting and non-exporting ﬁrms.
The Theil index allows decomposing overall inequality into within- and between-group components in the
following way:



















where   is an income measure, j indexes the groups, φj is the population weight of group j, ¯  j is the average
income in group j, ¯   is the group—wide average income, and Tj is the Theil index for group j computed
a c c o r d i n gt o( 2 7 ) . 53 We can now easily compute the within component of inequality as the income-weighted
average inequality within the two groups:













is the income share of workers employed in the nonexporting ﬁrms. Note that in autarky Sw,d =1and
Tw,d = μ − ln(1 + μ), while when all ﬁrms export Sw,d =0 . The inequality among workers in the exporting
ﬁr m si sa l w a y sTw,x = μ − ln(1 + μ) and in the nonexporting ﬁrms Tw,d <μ− ln(1 + μ) when 0 <ρ<1.
The immediate implication is
Proposition 7 The within component of sectoral wage inequality is lower in any open economy equilibrium
than in autarky and is the same as in autarky when all ﬁrms export. By consequence, the inequality component
between workers employed in exporting and non-exporting ﬁrms is higher in any trade equilibrium and the
movements in the between component dominate the movements in the within component.
53A direct calculation conﬁrms that the two alternative deﬁnitions of the aggregate Theil index, (27) and
(39), are equivalent and consistent with each other (see also Bourguignon, 1979).
45Proof: Since Sw,d ∈ [0,1] and Tw,d ≤ μ−ln(1+μ) and Tw,x = μ−ln(1+μ), it follows that Tw,W ≤ μ−ln(1+μ)
with equality holding for ρ =0and ρ =1and strict inequality otherwise. From Proposition 2 we know
that sectoral wage inequality, Tw = Tw,W + Tw,B, is higher in any trade equilibrium than in autarky. This
necessarily implies that the between component of inequality has to be larger in any trade equilibrium than
in autarky; moreover, movements in the between component dominate those in the within component. ¥
This proposition has an interesting implication that the source behind the inequality increase in open economy
relative to autarky is the growth in inequality between workers employed in the exporting ﬁrms which pay
high wages and nonexporting ﬁrms which pay low wages.
B.1.4 Actual and Counterfactual Wage Distributions
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and the mean of this distribution can be written as
¯ w =( 1+μ)wd
1+η2ρϑ2
1+η1ρϑ1 .













Therefore we can establish the following result:
wc
d >w d since
1+η2ρϑ2
1+η1ρϑ1 > 1 for 0 <ρ<1,











(1 + η1)ρϑ1 ,
with the inequality being satisﬁed since:
1+η2ρϑ2
1+η1ρϑ1 =
(1 + η2)ρϑ2 +( 1− ρϑ2)
(1 + η1)ρϑ1 +( 1− ρϑ1)
=
(1 + η2)ρϑ2









(1 + η1)ρϑ1 ,















, but the same arguments apply in both cases.
We can also show that the slope of the counterfactual wage distribution is smaller than the slope of the



















































































































since η1 <η 2 and ρϑ1 <ρ ϑ2. As a result, whenever φ(ρ) ≤ 0, we also necessarily have φ
0(ρ) < 0. Therefore,
if there exists ρ0 such that φ(ρ0)=0 ,t h e nφ(ρ) < 0 for all ρ>ρ 0. But since φ(1) = 0,t h i si m p l i e st h a t
φ(ρ) > 0 for all ρ ∈ (0,1).
We now establish that Gc
w (w) second-order stochastically dominates Gw (w) for ρ ∈ (0,1).S i n c e t h e














w(w)=0for w ∈ [wd,wc
d). We introduce the following notation:






47and it remains to show that ∆ > 0.N o t et h a t wlnw is a convex function. Therefore, it remains to show
that Gw(w) is second-order stochastically dominated by Gc


















, we know that this inequality holds for all w>w (θ
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since for this range
gw(w) − gc
w(w)=( C − Cc)w−(2+1/μ),
where C and Cc are positive constants.
Note that in both cases the above characterization of gw(w)−gc
w(w) implies that this diﬀerence of density
functions is positive for low values of w, negative for intermediate values of w, and again positive for larger
values of w. This immediately implies that the cumulative distribution functions intersect only once in the
range where the diﬀerence of density functions is negative (see Figure 2 in the text), which is a suﬃcient
condition to establish that indeed Gc
w(w) second-order stochastically dominates Gw(w) (see, for example,
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995, p.195).
B.2 Derivation of Results in Section 3.3
Using the solution for ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables (22), the expression for the sectoral hiring rate σ in Section 3.3













































Γ nd. Evaluating the integrals using the
Pareto productivity distribution yields (30) in the main text. Using the notation introduced in Appendix
Section B.1, (30) can be re-written as:
σ =
1+η1ρϑ1
1+η2ρϑ2 σA <σ A,
48since 0 <ρ≤ 1, η1 <η 2 and ϑ1 >ϑ 2. Therefore, the hiring rate is lower in any open economy equilibrium
than in autarky. Since the sectoral unemployment rate is equal to u =1 −σx,w h e r ex =1 /b does not depend
on the degree of openness, the sectoral unemployment rate is higher in any open economy equilibrium than
in autarky.
B.3 Derivation of Results in Section 3.4
Using the decomposition of the Theil index introduced in (39), we can write Tι = TιW + TιB,w h e r ew e
split the workers attached to the diﬀerentiated sector into employed and unemployed. Consider ﬁrst the
within-group component, TιW. All unemployed receive the same income of zero so that the Theil index for
them is Tu =0 . Additionally, the share of unemployed in income is zero and the share of employed is 1.
Therefore, the within-group component of income inequality is:
TιW =0· Tu +1· Tw = Tw.
Next consider the between-group component, TιB.W eh a v e :
TιB =0· ln0 + 1 · ln[1/(1 − u)] = −ln(1 − u),
where 1/(1 − u)= ¯ w/¯ ι is the ratio of the average income of the employed to the average income in the
population, since ¯ ι = u · 0+( 1− u) · ¯ w. Combining these expressions for the within- and between-group
components yields the expression for sectoral income inequality in (31) in the main text. In fact, this
constitutes a proof of a more general result:
Lemma 5 Let u be the share of unemployed in the population with no income and Tw be the Theil index
of wage inequality among the employed with wages constituting the only source of income. Then the Theil
index of income inequality in the population is given by Tι = Tw − ln(1 − u).
B.4 Derivation of Results in Section 3.5
We showed in Section A.5 that L increases in both countries as variable trade costs, τ, fall if countries
are nearly symmetric in their labor market frictions. This implies that trade shifts resources towards the
diﬀerentiated sector which constitutes the compositional eﬀect discussed in the text.
Next we compute the aggregate Theil index of income inequality using the decomposition provided in (39).
Consider the between component ﬁrst. Since average income in both sectors is the same and equal to 1 (due
to the workers’ indiﬀerence condition between the sectors), we have TιB =0 .F u r t h e r ,L/¯ L constitutes the
income share of the workers attached to the diﬀerentiated sector and Tι,d e ﬁn e di n( 3 1 ) ,i st h eT h e i li n d e x
of income inequality in the diﬀerentiated sector. In addition, all workers in the homogeneous-good sector
receive a constant wage of one; therefore, the Theil index of income inequality in the homogenous sector is
zero. Combining these arguments together, we have the within component: TιW = L/¯ L · Tι.A s ar e s u l t ,
the aggregate index of income inequality is




as stated in (33).
49As explained in the text, the aggregate index of wage inequality can be derived from the aggregate index
of income inequality by twice applying Lemma 5. The same result obtains if one uses decomposition formula
(39) and partitions the employed workers by sector. For more on this derivation and for the discussion of
nonmonotonicity of the compositional eﬀect see Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2008).
C Derivation of Results in Section 4
We now derive the Taylor approximations to the sectoral hiring rate and Theil index of wage inequality
around ρ =0 .C o n s i d e rﬁrst the hiring rate deﬁned in (30). Note that the autarkic hiring rate, σA,d o e sn o t
depend on any parameters characterizing trade openness of the sector, including ρ and Υx. Therefore, we
need to consider only the behavior of the hiring rate in the open economy relative to that in autarky:


















One can show that ϕ decreases monotonically in Υx and decreases in ρ when ρ is low, but may be decreasing
or increasing in ρ when ρ is high (see Figure 4 for both examples). Movements in τ,h o w e v e r ,a ﬀect both ρ
and Υx at the same time.54 To make further progress, we use the relationship between Υx and ρ provided














Using this representation, the relative hiring rate is a function of ρ (as long as fx is constant, so that ρ



















































which establishes the claim in Lemma 3.
Next we look at the Theil index of wage inequality. To compute a closed form of this index, we partition
the population of workers in the diﬀerentiated sector into those employed by exporting ﬁrms and those
employed by nonexporting ﬁrms, and then apply the decomposition formula (39). Using the result in
Section B.1 of the Appendix, we can write the between- and within-components of sectoral wage inequality
54We were unable to prove that the hiring rate is monotonically decreasing as τ falls. However, we showed
that it is necessarily the case both when ρ ≈ 0 and ρ ≈ 1. Our conjecture is that the eﬀect is monotonic for
all parameter values.
50as:








with the overall wage inequality in the sector given by Tw = TwW + TwB.N o t et h a ta l lt h ei n g r e d i e n t si n
these formulas were already deﬁned and provided explicitly in Section B.1. Putting everything together and
substituting out Υx using (35), we have the following closed form expression for the Theil index:





















































As with the hiring rate, we take the Taylor approximation to this expression term-by-term around ρ =0to
obtain:












































ρz lnρ + O(ρz),
which establishes the second claim in Lemma 3. Note that the derivative of −ρz lnρ is −ρz−1(lnρ +1 )> 0
for ρ ≈ 0.
Next consider the eﬀects of τ, b/b∗ and c/c∗ on ρ, as described in Lemma 4. Section A.5 of the Appendix
derives the comparative statics for θd and θx with respect to these parameters (the response of L to these
parameters is also discussed there). From that section we know that θd increases and θx decreases as τ, b/b∗
and c/c∗ fall. This immediately implies that ρ = θd/θx moves in the same direction with θd,a ss t a t e di n
Lemma 4.
D Simulation Parameters
In Figures 1-5, we illustrate the qualitative features of the model by displaying solutions for particular
parameter values. In this appendix, we discuss the choice of parameter values used in the ﬁgures.
We set β =0 .75 and ζ =0 .5. This corresponds to an elasticity of substitution of 4 between varieties
within the diﬀerentiated sector and an elasticity of substitution of 2 across sectors. These numbers are broadly
consistent with the estimates in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) and Broda and Weinstein (2006).
Next, we set τ =1 .5, which implies a variable trade cost of 50% in line with the estimates in Anderson
and van Wincoop (2004). This also implies an exporter wage premium of 4.5% after controlling for size
diﬀerence, consistent with the ﬁndings in Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007). The ﬁxed costs are
51set such that fx/fd =0 .2 and fd/fe =1 .6, which results in 10% of ﬁrms exiting and 18% of ﬁrms exporting,
also consistent with the evidence.
We set the shape parameter of the ability distribution to k =2 , following the calibration in Saez (2001).
We set δ/k =3 .5, which results in an unconditional wage-size premium of 36%, consistent with the evidence
in Oi and Idson (1999). Further, we set z =2 .6 which implies a coeﬃcient of variation of ﬁrm productivity
of 0.80. Finally, we set γ =1 /3,w h i c hr e s u l t si nac o e ﬃcient of variation of revenue per worker of 0.25. Both
these numbers are broadly consistent with the ﬁndings in Hsieh and Klenow (2008) for the U.S. economy.
These parameters imply μ =0 .19 and an economy-wide Gini coeﬃcient of income distribution of about 0.30
(on par with the Gini coeﬃcients in Western Europe, but lower than in the U.S.).
We set amin = θmin =1which are mere normalizations. We consider a symmetric equilibrium with
c = c∗ =0 .28,w h i c he n s u r e sad ' amin, i.e., that even the least productive ﬁrm screens, but it is almost
indiﬀerent between screening and not screening. This results in σA =0 .85 and σ =0 .82.A s a r e s u l t , i n
autarky 15% of the sampled workers are not hired due to screening, while in the trade equilibrium 18% of the
sampled workers are not hired due to screening. In addition, we set b = b∗ =1 .05, so that 5% of the workers
searching for jobs in the diﬀerentiated sector are not matched with any ﬁrm. This results in a 19% sectoral
unemployment rate in autarky and a 22% sectoral unemployment rate in the trade equilibrium. Finally, we
set ¯ L =1 , so that in equilibrium close to a third of labor income is derived from the diﬀerentiated sector
and the aggregate rate of unemployment is 6.7%.
For Figures 1-2 we use the baseline parameters. In Figures 3-5, respectively, we vary the ﬁxed exporting
cost, fx, the variable trade cost, τ, and the domestic search cost, b, holding constant all other parameters.
Although we have chosen parameters consistent with some features of the data, our simulations are
designed to illustrate the theoretical results; they do not represent a calibration of the model. A proper
calibration requires more ﬂexible functional forms or a richer model.
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